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INFORMED CONSENT FOR NEONATAL 
CIRCUMCISION: AN ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
CONUNDRUM 
J. Steven Svoboda 
RobertS. Van Howe 
James G. Dwyer* 
INTRODUCTION 
Neonatal circumcision is the surgery most commonly performed on 
children, yet reliable information regarding the surgery is not usually 
made available to parents when they are asked .to consent to the 
procedure for their newborn sons. Often, parents are simply presented 
with a paper to sign permitting the physician to perform the surgery, 
without any discussion of the health risks or alternatives. Many medical 
professionals, medical ethicists and legal scholars now dispute the 
advisability, and even permissibility, of circumcising newborn boys.1 
Margaret Somerville, a prominent Canadian medical ethicist, recently 
went so far as to assert that neonatal circumcision constitutes assault 
under the Canadian criminal code.2 Numerous legal scholars have 
* J. Steven Svoboda, J.D., Executive Director, Attorneys for the Rights of the 
Child, Berkeley, California. RobertS. Van Howe, M.D., F.A.A.P., Department of 
Pediatrics Marshfield Clinic - Lakeland Center, Minocqua, Wisconsin. James G. 
Dwyer, J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, William & Mary School of Law. 
1. See generally R.S. Van Howe, Consent for Circumcision, 156 CAN. MED. 
Ass'N J. 17 (1997); Jeremy Klein, Circumcision and Consent, 27 FAM. PRAC. NEWS 
13 (1997); M.A. Somerville and D.M. Alwin, Lidocaine-Prilocaine Cream for Pain 
during Circumcision, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 568 (1997); D. Keleti, Lidocaine-
Prilocaine Cream for Pain during Circumcision, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 568 (1997); 
S. L. Bond, State Laws Criminalizing Female Circumcision: A Violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
353 (1999); J. Smith, Male Circumcision and the Rights of the Child, in Netherlands 
Institute of Human Rights (SIM), in SIM SPECIAL No. 21 To BAEHR IN OUR 
MINDS. ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE HEART OF THE NETHERLANDS 475-
97 (1999) at http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/specials/simsp2Lasp (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2000). 
2. See S. Kirkey, Circumcising Baby Boys 'Criminal Assault': Ethicist Says 
Society Must Consider Ban, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 17, 1997 at 1; see also 
Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 45, 265{1)(a) (2000) (Can.) [hereinafter Criminal 
Code of Canada]. 
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concluded that routine neonatal circumcision falls within the legal 
definition of child abuse and violates children's civil and human rights 
under national and internationallaw.3 Consent to a procedure that is per 
se illegal is, of course, invalid regardless of the motives of the consenting 
party.4 But even if it were legally and ethically permissible for parents to 
authorize circumcision of their sons, empirical studies have shown that the 
manner in which doctors typically obtain "informed consent" for neonatal 
circumcision from parents falls far below the standard of care required of 
the medical profession.5 
This article examines whether and when parental consent to 
circumcision should be legally effective. It begins by identifying the legal 
and ethical requirements for consent that apply when medical 
professionals treat competent adult patients; requirements such as full 
disclosure, adequate capacity to consent, and voluntariness. It then 
analyzes how the rules and principles applicable in that context translate 
into legal and ethical requirements for consent to treatment of 
incompetent persons, and, in particular, treatment of children. It shows 
that, under normal circumstances, medical professionals may not 
prophylactically remove healthy tissue from even consenting adult 
patients, and that as a general rule, parents, regardless of their religious 
convictions, may not authorize medically unnecessary procedures on their 
children. The article then assesses the implications of those requirements 
for the practice of "routine circumcision" - that is, circumcision of infant 
males born with normal genitalia. It concludes that, because routine 
3. See Smith, supra note 1, at 
http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/specials/simsp21.asp; see also C. Price, Male 
Circumcision: An Ethical and Legal Affront, 128 BULL. OF MED. ETHICS 13 (May 
1997); A.J. Chessler, Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 
555 (1997); J. Steven Svoboda, Routine Infant Male Circumcision: Examining the 
Human Rights and Constitutional Issues, in SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: A HUMAN 
TRAGEDY 205-15, (G.C. Denniston and M.F. Milos, eds. 1997); J.G. Dwyer, The 
Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education 
Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. 
REV. 1321 (1996); C.A. Bonner & M.J. Kinane, Circumcision: the Legal and 
Constitutional Issues, THE TRUTH SEEKER, at S1-S4 (July/Aug. 1989); W.E. 
Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues, 23 J. 
FAM. L. 337 (1985). 
4. See, e.g., K.M. Harrison, Law, Order, and the Consent Defense, 12 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 477, 497 (2000). 
5. See generally C. Ciesielski-Carlucci et al., Determinant of Decision-Making 
for Circumcision, 5 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 228 (1996). 
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circumctston causes significant harm while providing no appreciable 
medical benefits, parental consent to the procedure is invalid. If 
circumcision can ever ethically and legally be performed, it is only when 
the male reaches adulthood and is capable of deciding for himself to 
undergo the procedure. 
I. THE PREREQUISITES OF EFFECTIVE CONSENT TO SURGERY 
The common law has always recognized battery- violation of a person's 
right to be free from unwanted touching - as a civil and criminal wrong. 
In this century, courts have increasingly emphasized the strong interest 
each person has in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily 
integrity.6 Subject to certain exceptions - such as, emergencies posing 
threats to life or danger of grievous bodily harm, self defense, jostling in a 
crowd and contact . sports - any willful touching of another person is 
unlawful absent the valid consent of that person or of another person 
authorized to consent on that person's behalf.7 If no valid consent exists, 
even slight physical contact may give rise to liability.8 
Medical professionals can also be civilly and criminally liable for 
wrongful violation of bodily integrity, as well as be subject to professional 
disciplinary action.9 Surgery has long been recognized as a technical 
battery that, regardless of the health-care provider's intentions, can be 
excused only when there is express or implied consent from the patient.10 
6. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); 
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977). 
7. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report No. 51, Consent to 
Health Care of Young People 1:15 (1996). 
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 
9 at 41-42 (5th ed. 1984). 
9. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); Bonner 
v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, supra note 7, at 24-44; Family Law Council [of Australia], 
Sterilization and Other Medical Procedures on Children-Discussion Paper 17-25 
(Barton, ACT; Oct. 1993); J. Wilson, E. Della Torre and R. Ludbrook, My Body, 
My Decision: Children's Consent to Medical Treatment-Discussion Paper 
(Sydney: Mar. 1995). 
10. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Del. 1991) (holding 
that an operation without informed consent constitutes battery); see also KEETON, 
supra note 8, § 18 at 114; Criminal Code of Canada, supra note 2; Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); 
Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122. 
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As one landmark Canadian court decision held, "any intentional 
nonconsensual touching which is harmful or offensive to a person's 
reasonable sense of dignity is actionable. "11 This is true even if the 
treatment proves to be beneficial or even necessary to preserve a patient's 
life.12 Absent effective consent, liability arises simply from the act of 
touching. 
The consent requirement primarily protects the patient's bodily 
integrity .13 In the case of competent persons, it also protects personal 
autonomy. Because of the critical interests at stake, consent must be 
"informed" in order to be valid: the individual must know to what he is 
consenting.14 If the physician has not given the patient all the information 
that the patient needs to make a knowledgeable decision regarding his 
medical care, any consent the patient gives is ineffectual.15 The informed 
consent requirement applies even to minor surgical procedures with 
extremely slight risks, such as the removal of a wart. 16 
II. ADULTS 
A. How does consent work when the patient is a competent adult? 
Competent adult patients are entitled to make the decisions regarding 
their medical care themselves.17 This uncontroverted principle is 
fundamental to medical practice. The entitlement arises from the 
principle of individual self-determination that lies at the core of our 
political system and moral beliefs.18 To facilitate self-determination in the 
medical setting, a process of "informed consent" has evolved. 
11. MaJette v. Shulman [1990] 67 D.L.R. 4th 321, 327 (Can.). 
12. See Matter of Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a 
competent adult has a common-law right to decline or accept medical treatment, a 
violation of which right results in civil liability for those who administer medical 
treatment without consent, despite fact that treatment may be beneficial or even 
necessary to preserve patient's life). 
13. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, supra note 7, at 15. 
14. See Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wash. 1980). 
15. See id. 
16. Edward Etchells eta!., Bioethics for Clinicians: 1. Consent, 155 CAN. MED. 
Ass'N J. 177 (1996). 
17. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (1914); In 
re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247 (D.C. 1990). 
18. See PRISCILLA ALDERSON, CHILDREN'S CONSENT TO SURGERY 30 (1993). 
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"[I]nformed consent is an autonomous authorization of medical 
intervention. . . by individual patients."19 Proper respect for the 
individual patient and for his right to control his own life requires that 
physicians refrain from surgical interventions, unless they are authorized 
by the patient based on an understanding of the best available 
information pertaining to a proposed procedure.20 In legal terms, securing 
consent without providing adequate information constitutes legally 
redressable negligence.21 
Thus, while patients necessarily rely on physicians to find the source of 
a malady if there is one,22 once physicians have identified a problem and 
delineated treatment options, the patient's right of consent requires that 
the patient actively participate in the process of deciding which option to 
choose. Accordingly, the physician has a legal and professional duty to 
engage the patient in the consent process.23 Specific requirements for 
informed consent have become increasingly stringent, reflecting modern 
society's greater skepticism toward medical authority and increased 
concern with safeguarding bodily integrity and personal autonomy.24 
Today those requirements fall into three categories: disclosure, capacity 
and voluntariness.25 
1. Disclosure 
The duty of disclosure arises from the principle that an individual's 
right to self-determination entails a right to know the truth and to receive 
19. Tom L. Beauchamp & Ruth R. Faden, Informed Consent: II. Meaning and 
Elements of Informed Consent, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1240 (Warren 
T. Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995). 
20. See Etchells et al., supra note 16, at 187. 
21. See Bourgeois v. McDonald, 622 So. 2d 684, 688 (La. Ct. App. 1993); see 
also K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1995); Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 772,783 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
22. R.B. Deber et al., What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in Treatment 
Decision Making?, 156 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1414, 1416 (1996); see also 
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782; see generally L.A. Siminoff & J.H. Fetting, Factors 
Affecting Treatment Decisions for a Life-Threatening Illness: the Case of Medical 
Treatment of Breast Cancer, 32 Soc. Sci. & MED. 813 (1991). 
23. See Etch ells et al., supra note 16, at 177-80. 
24. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 793-94 ("physician's privilege to withhold 
information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed . . . for 
otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself."). 
25. See Etchells et al., supra note 16, at 177-80. 
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any and all information that is available, so that the treatment decision is 
the individual's own decision rather than someone else's decision.26 
Patients have a relatively high desire for information.27 An uninformed 
decision to follow the recommendation or suggestion of a medical 
professional is in effect a choice coerced by the medical professional. In 
addition to honoring the patient's right to self-determination, disclosure 
facilitates the patient's ability to cope with the consequences of the 
procedure chosen.28 In contrast, a patient's discovery after the fact that he 
was not given all the information he would have wanted can undermine 
his ability to deal effectively and positively with any adverse effects of the 
29 procedure. 
Medical professionals do not always fulfill this duty of disclosure, even 
when treating competent adult patients, and with respect to some 
procedures it may be common practice to give the patient much less 
information than he or she would need to participate meaningfully in the 
decision-making. Forty years ago, a physician might have been insulated 
from liability for non-disclosure if this was the common and accepted 
practice among medical professionals in connection with the particular 
procedure.30 Today, a rule more respectful of patients prevails, requiring 
disclosure of all information that the patient would deem relevant in 
reaching a decision without regard to what the traditional common 
. h b 31 practice as een. 
Thus, before obtaining consent to a medical procedure, a physician 
must provide adequate information to the patient in a manner that the 
patient can comprehend.32 "Adequate" means the amount and kind of 
information that the average person in the patient's position would want 
26. See generally Philip C. Hebert et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 7. Truth 
Telling, 156 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 225 (1997); Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 606-
07 (Cal. 1993) (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,10-12 (Cal. 1972)). 
27. See Deber et al., supra note 22, at 1417. 
28. See ALDERSON, supra note 18, at 133, 155, 190. 
29. See Mcinerney v. MacDonald (1992) 93 D.L.R. 4th 415,425-26 (Can.). 
30. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (Del. 1961); Bolam v. 
Friern Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., 2 All E.R. 118, 118, 1 W.L.R. 582 (Q.B.D. 1957); P. 
Parkinson, Children's Rights and Doctors' Immunities: The Implications of the 
High Court's Decision In re Marion, 6 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 101, 123 (1992). 
31. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 u.s. 1064 (1972). 
32. See Edward Etchells et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 2. Disclosure, 155 
CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 387 (1996). 
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to have in reaching an informed decision.33 Typically this means that the 
clinician must fully explain the proposed procedure, the expected short-
term risks and long-term consequences, the available alternatives and 
their risks and benefits and the consequences of declining or delaying 
treatment.34 The patient should be made aware of both short-term costs-
for example, pain, length of confinement in a hospital, recovery time and 
potential complications - and long-term costs - such as loss of functioning, 
restriction of activities and physical scarring. In general, the test "for 
determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to 
the patient's decision."35 Physicians must disclose all material information, 
that is, all "information which the physician knows or should know would 
be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position 
when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure."36 
Importantly, the physician has an obligation to provide all significant 
information that is available, even if he or she were previously unaware of 
it. In other words, the duty of disclosure entails an obligation on the part 
of the physician to acquire information as it becomes available.37 
Naturally, there is a limit to how much and what kind of information 
medical professionals must provide. The physician's duty is to provide 
information that the average person would need to make an intelligent 
decision. This suggests that information that is not relevant need not be 
provided. Relevant information is that which would have a bearing, from 
the patient's perspective, on medical care.38 The materiality criterion 
suggests that physicians need not provide information that would not 
influence the average patient's decision-making. However, even very 
slight risks generally must be disclosed to patients, particularly if the 
consequences may be severe. In a recent Australian case, for example, a 
33. See id. 
34. See id.; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782. 
35. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (citing Canterbury, 464 F .2d at 
786); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (1990) 
(following the "well-established principles" regarding informed consent first set 
forth in Cobbs v. Grant). 
36. Arata v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598,607 (Cal. 1993). 
37. See American Medical Association [hereinafter AMA), CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 136 (1996). 
38. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782; see also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. 
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); see also Canadian Medical Association, Code of 
Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association, 155 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1176A 
(1996). 
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patient who underwent an elective operation on her right eye and who 
had persistently questioned the physician concerning potential 
complications was never informed that there was a one in 14,000 chance 
that the operation would leave her blind. The operation did in fact leave 
her virtually blind. 39 The High Court of Australia ruled that the physician 
was negligent in not revealing the risk of this complication, even though 
the risk was slight. 40 This ruling is consistent with patients' expectations; a 
1988 study in Australia found that 77% of patients said that they wanted 
more information about their treatment.41 
In addition to requirements as to the content of information provided, 
a physician's duty of disclosure entails a requirement as to how he or she 
provides the information: she must provide the requisite information in a 
manner conducive to patient comprehension. Studies have found that 
some form of written disclosure, either alone or in combination with 
verbal disclosure, imparts greater knowledge than verbal disclosure 
alone.42 This suggests that physicians should provide full written 
39. Rogers v. Whitaker (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.). 
40. See id. at 489-91. 
41. Law Reform Commission of Victoria (Report 24), Australian Law 
Reform Commission (Report 50), and New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission (Report 62), Informed Decisions About Medical Procedures (1989) at 
9. 
42. See Helen Dunkelman, Patients' Knowledge of Their Condition and 
Treatment: How It Might Be Improved, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 311, 311 (1979); see also 
Barrie R. Cassileth et al., Informed Consent - Why Are Its Goals Imperfectly 
Realized?, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 896, 896 (1980); S.A. Layton, Informed Consent 
in Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery: a Study of Its Efficacy, 30 BRIT. J. ORAL & 
MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 319, 319, 322 (1992); D. J. Byrne, A. Napier & A. 
Cuschieri, How Informed Is Signed Consent?, 296 BRIT. MED. J. 839, 839-40 
(1988); Hyman B. Muss et al., Written Informed Consent in Patients with Breast 
Cancer, 43 CANCER 1549, 1549 (1979); H. J. Sutherland et al., Are We Getting 
Informed Consent from Patients with Cancer?, 83 J. ROYAL Soc'Y MED. 439, 439 
(1990); George Robinson & Avraham Merav, Informed Consent: Recall by 
Patients Tested Postoperatively, 22 ANNALS OF THORACIC SURGERY 209, 209 
(1976); Terence C. Wade, Patients May Not Recall Disclosure of Risk of Death: 
Implications for Informed Consent, 30 MED., SCI. & L. 259, 259 (1990); Niels 
Lynoe et al., Informed Consent: Study of Quality of Information Given to 
Participants in a Clinical Trial, 303 BRIT. MED. J. 610, 612 (1991); S. Gibbs et al., 
Communicating Information to Patients About Medicine, 83 J. RoYAL Soc'Y MED. 
292, 292 (1990); Kenneth D. Hopper & Harry N. Tyler, Informed Consent for 
Intravascular Administration of Contrast Material: How Much Is Enough?, 171 
RADIOLOGY 509, 509 (1989); G. Askew et al., Informed Consent: Can We Educate 
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explanations of procedures to their patients when practicable. 
Presumably, this would be practicable with respect to any procedures 
performed routinely or in non-emergency situations. 
Exceptions to the disclosure requirement, if any, are legally tenuous. A 
patient may voluntarily forgo some elements of disclosure, but it is not 
clear that this "waiver" provides the physician any protection from a 
negligence suit. 43 The so-called "therapeutic privilege," adopted in the 
past by the Supreme Court of Canada as sometimes permitting the 
withholding of information in order to lessen the patient's suffering, 44 is 
increasingly disfavored, and, in fact, has more recently been ruled 
unacceptable in that country.45 The High Court of Australia has similarly 
ruled, "Except in those cases where there is a particular danger that the 
provision of all relevant information will harm an unusually nervous, 
disturbed or volatile patient, no special medical skill is involved in 
[complying with legal mandates that require] disclosing the information, 
Patients?, 35 J. R. C. SURGERY EDINB. 308, 308-09 (1990); Rose A. Gates et al. , 
Patient Acceptance of an Information Sheet About Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
Options, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 679, 679 (1993); A.J. Tymchuk et al., Medical 
Decision-Making among Elderly People in Long-Term Care, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 
59 (June supp. 1988); P.J. D. Dawes et al., Informed Consent: The Assessment of 
Two Structured Interview Approaches Compared to the Current Approach, 106 J. 
LARYNGOLOGY & OTOLOGY 420, 420, 423 (1992); Irwin Kleinman et al., 
Effectiveness of Two Methods for Informing Schizophrenic Patients about 
Neuroleptic Medication, 44 HOSP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 1189, 1189 (1993); S. 
Layton & J. Korsen, Informed Consent in Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery: A Study 
of the Value of Written Warnings, 32 BRIT. J. ORAL & MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY, 
34, 34 (1994); R. J. Simes et al., Randomised Comparison of Procedures for 
Obtaining Informed Consent in Clinical Trials of Treatment for Cancer, 293 BRIT. 
MED. J. 1065 (1986); Etchells et al., supra note 29, at 38~-91. 
43. Etchells et al., supra note 33, at 387-91. 
44. See Reihl v. Hughes, (1980) 114 D.L.R. 3d 1, 15-17 (Can.); see also Hopp 
v. Lepp, (1980) 112 D.L.R. 3d 67, 77 (Can.) ( "(A] surgeon has some leeway in 
assessing the emotional condition of the patient and how the prospect of an 
operation weighs upon him; the apprehension, if any, of the patient. . . [and] his 
reluctance, if any, to submit to an operation .... "); Margaret A. Somerville, 
Therapeutic Privilege: Variation on the theme of Informed Consent, 12 L., MED. & 
HEALTH CARE 4, 11 (1984) (proposing that therapeutic privilege be seen as more 
complex and sophisticated than previously envisioned, and that it be applied in 
certain circumstances as a qualification of informed consent doctrine which may 
prevent the latter from causing suffering disproportionate to the benefits it 
confers.). 
45. See Meyer Estate v. Rogers, [1991] 78 D.L.R. 4th 307,316 (Can.). 
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including the risks attending the proposed treatment."46 By comparison, 
the therapeutic privilege doctrine has never received much support in the 
United States; just a smattering of lower courts have on rare occasions 
endorsed it.47 As early as 1972, in the leading case of Canterbury v. 
Spence, the District of Columbia Circuit tersely observed that the 
"physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons 
must be carefully circumscribed ... for otherwise it might devour the 
disclosure rule itself."48 The rule is that physicians must provide accurate 
and complete information to all patients, even though a small percentage 
might prefer not to know about the risks of surgery.49 The only generally 
recognized exception, which is narrowly construed, applies to situations 
where, because of the patient's emotional condition, disclosure is very 
likely to cause physical or mental harm.50 
2. Capacity 
Capacity is the patient's ability to understand information relating to 
treatment decisions and to appreciate the consequences of a decision.51 
The capacity requirement reflects the belief that persons unable to make 
rational decisions about their medical care should be protected from 
46. See Rogers v. Whitaker, (1992) 175 C.L.R. 479, 492 (Austl.). 
47. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 
u.s. 1064 (1972). 
48. ld.; see also Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962) 
(ruling that where a patient was in a fragile emotional state, concerned about the 
operation, had previously experienced thyroidectomy, and a second gynecological 
operation was to be performed simultaneously, the physician was not liable for 
having failed to apprise the patient of all the hazards of thyroidectomy.); Hubert 
W. Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick 
with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REv, 349 (1946) (arguing for therapeutic 
privilege, while conceding "there is little or no (U.S.] legal authority bearing on 
the existence of such a privilege"); Marcella J. Mulvaney, The Therapeutic 
Privilege: Defense in an Informed Consent Action, 42 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 63 
(1996) (arguing that Arata v. Avedon resuscitated therapeutic privilege by holding 
that physicians are not required to disclose statistical life expectancy information 
to patients). 
49. !d.; see also Roberts, 206 F. Supp. at 583; Mulvaney, supra note 48, at 63, 
Smith, supra note 48, at 349. 
50. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; see also ELLEN I. PICARD, LEGAL 
LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN CANADA 99 (2d ed. 1984). 
51. See Edward Etchells et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 3. Capacity, 155 CAN. 
MED. Ass'N J. 657 (1996). 
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making decisions that are harmful or that they would not make if they 
were able. The requirement imposes on physicians a duty to assess 
whether a patient is capable of both understanding the relevant medical 
information and making a rational decision based upon that information. 
To accomplish this, the clinician should provide full disclosure about a 
proposed procedure and then evaluate whether the patient does in fact 
understand the information disclosed. In dealing with competent adults, 
medical professionals must presume that the adult has the requisite 
capacity and proceed with full disclosure unless and until they determine 
that the patient is actually not capable of understanding. Non-disclosure 
cannot be justified by a suspicion or uncertainty concerning the adult's 
capacity for understanding. 
Unfortunately, a patient's understanding is often limited not so much 
by his inherent inability to comprehend, but by the clinician's inability to 
convey information understandably. The capacity requirement precludes 
doctors from obtaining consent without full disclosure based on the 
doctor's determination of incapacity, where any incapacity can be cured 
by reasonably improving the manner in which information is presented. 
In fact, this requirement suggests a duty on the part of medical 
professionals to make greater efforts to communicate information when 
initial efforts are unsuccessful. 
3. V oluntariness 
The voluntariness requirement protects the patient's right to make 
health care choices free from manipulation or undue influence.52 
Manipulation occurs where medical personnel distort and/or omit 
information in order to induce the patient's acceptance or rejection of a 
procedure. 53 Full disclosure can obviate manipulation by omission, but not 
the danger of manipulation by distortion. 
The power imbalance between doctor and patient creates a great 
danger of undue influence. A patient cannot obtain treatment without an 
agreeable medical professional, and typically can do little more than 
respond to treatment proposals the physician offers. Patients are often ill 
52. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT 259 (1986). 
53. See David A. Pendleton & Stephen Bochner, The Communication of 
Medical Information in General Practice Consultations as a Function of Patients' 
Social Class, 14A Soc. Sci. & MED. 669, 672 (1980); see also M.C. Shapiro et al., 
Information Control and the Exercise of Power in the Obstetrical Encounter, 17 
Soc. SCI. & MED. 139, 144-45 (1983). 
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and anxious at the time consent is sought, making them even more 
vulnerable to influence by medical professionals. Because of the inherent 
imbalance of power in the physician-patient relationship, the manner and 
order in which physicians present information can greatly influence the 
importance patients attach to different considerations and can, 
intentionally or otherwise, persuade the patient to select the option 
favored by the physician. 
Therefore, the physician has a duty to distance himself as much as 
possible from his personal preferences and values and to present 
information in a manner that reflects an objective assessment of the 
interests at stake for the patient. Physicians also must be sensitive to the 
fact that patients are likely to interpret a suggestion, or even the mere 
mention of an option, as a recommendation. To counteract this danger, 
bioethicists recommend that physicians actively and explicitly encourage 
patients to make decisions independently.54 
The timing of disclosure is also important. The immediacy of the need 
for a medical procedure can interfere with the patient making a voluntary 
decision. The patient may have little time to digest information and 
reflect on alternatives; he or she is likely to be emotionally overwrought 
and be especially reliant on the physician to make decisions for him or 
her. Certainly with an elective procedure that can be performed at any 
time, it would be inexcusable for a physician not to provide a patient with 
full disclosure far in advance to allow the patient sufficient time to reflect 
on whether to undergo the procedure. 
In sum, an adult patient's decision to undergo a procedure must truly 
be his or her decision, a true reflection of his or her autonomy and right to 
self-determination. This will only be true if the physician fully and 
objectively discloses all information relevant and material to the decision. 
Doing so ensures that the patient understands the information, 
encourages the patient to rriake the decision independently and steers 
clear of any actions that could amount to undue influence and/or 
. 1 . 55 mampu at10n. 
54. See Edward Etchells et a!., Bioethics for Clinicians: 4. Voluntariness, 155 
CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1083, 1086 (1996). 
55. Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients' Decisions: Cognitive 
and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 72, 75 (1993); see generally Code of 
Medical Ethics, supra note 33. 
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B. How does informed consent work when competent adults request 
non-medically indicated procedures? 
A physician's obligation regarding the content of information provided 
to a patient is even greater in connection with procedures, such as 
cosmetic surgery, that are not "medically indkated," i.e., that are not 
undertaken to secure a medical benefit.56 Because the procedure entails 
no medical benefit, the only possible medical result is harm, so a physician 
must proceed with particular caution. 
The literature addressing consent for cosmetic surgery is fairly sparse; 
the American Medical Association Code of Ethics, for example, does not 
address it.57 However, a general principle running through the limited 
discussion available holds that the more elective the procedure, the more 
important the role of full disclosure.58 Because the patient is often eager 
to proceed prior to consulting the physician, the physician needs to 
temper this enthusiasm with a sobering enumeration of all possible 
complications. The clear disclosure of all significant health considerations 
is a prerequisite to the patient's ability to make a rational decision about 
whether to proceed.59 
Naturally, the physician should also ensure that someone requesting a 
procedure that is not medically indicated is fully competent and acting 
voluntarily. It would be particularly troubling· if a physician not only 
failed to ensure fully informed and uncoerced reflection on the potential 
costs of a non-medically indicated procedure but also in fact suggested the 
procedure or presented information about it in a way that could 
reasonably be interpreted as a recommendation. Encouraging a patient 
to undergo a procedure that has no medical benefit is presumptively 
inconsistent with medical ethics.60 
A strong concern regarding voluntariness may arise in situations where 
56. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACI'ICAL GUIDE 
12-64 (2d ed. 1990); Alderson, supra note 18, at 188-99. 
57. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 37. 
58. See Ciesielski-Carlucci, supra note 5, at 229; see also Tekanawa v. 
Millican, unreported Botting DCJ, Brisbane District Court, 11 February 1994, no. 
1219-92; NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENERAL 
GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL PRACI'ITIONERS ON PROVIDING INFORMATION TO 
PATIENTS 5, 5-6 (1993) (discussing a higher standard of disclosure of information is 
required where surgery is purely elective or cosmetic). 
59. Merilyn Evans, Augmentation Mammaplasty: Neither Simple Nor Safe, 8 
AUSTL. J. ADVANCED NURSING 19,23-24 (1991). 
60. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 37, at 134-35. 
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the cultural practices of some group dictates that individuals undergo a 
physical alteration that does not benefit them medically, particularly 
where those individuals are subordinate within the group. Indeed, a 
physician will often be ethically and legally barred from performing such 
procedures that might cause harm and that are without medical benefit. 
One example is a Muslim woman's request that a doctor circumcise her 
daughter. Probably already covered by common law assault statutes, the 
procedure is now specifically banned by a number of statutes passed in 
the last few years. Any physician who performs such a procedure violates 
medical ethics and, in many states, criminal and civil law as well.61 
Recently, a Seattle hospital agreed to perform a minor, largely symbolic, 
genital cutting on a Muslim woman who requested it, but subsequently 
reversed itself in the face of public outcry.62 This event reflects the 
widespread understanding that doctors should refuse to become complicit 
in physically harmful cultural practices and that consent should be treated 
with skepticism when it comes from persons who historically have been 
less than fully autonomous. At least two authors have noticed the 
dramatic disparity between the treatment of female genital cutting and 
circumcision, commenting emphatically on the violation of equal 
protection created by current statutory law.63 
61. See George Denniston, Circumcision and the Code of Ethics, 12 HUMANE 
HEALTH CARE INT'L 78 (1996) (arguing that routine infant male circumcision 
violates all seven principles of the American Medical Association's ethical code). 
Laws passed in the United States against female genital mutilation include the 
federal law (18 USC § 116) as well as numerous state statutes in California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North 
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
Countries that have outlawed the practice include Burkina Faso, Canada, Central 
African Republic, Cote d'lvoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and the United 
Kingdom. A complete list of all state and national laws with all citations appears IN 
ANIKA RAHMAN AND NAHID TOUBIA, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO 
LAWS AND POLICIES WORDLWIDE 101 (1999). See also Doriane L. Coleman, The 
Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L. 
REv. 717,751 (1998) (recounting the breakdown of "the Seattle compromise," in 
which-despite the proposed procedure's apparent consistency with all pertinent 
laws-public outcry prevented well-meaning doctors at one Seattle hospital from 
performing even a ceremonial nick of Somali girls' clitorises which would remove 
no tissue). 
62. See Doriane L. Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural 
Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L. REV. 717,736-37 (1998). 
63. See Bond, supra note 1, at 371-74; see also Ross Povenmire, Do Parents 
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C. Can adults consent to prophylactic removal of healthy tissue? 
What if a procedure is not needed to correct an existing problem, but 
might reduce or eliminate risk of medical problems in the future? 
Current practices and attitudes with respect to risk of cancer in women 
are instructive. Genetic tests can now detect genes that predispose 
women to breast and ovarian cancer. Women with the relevant mutations 
would significantly reduce the risk of contracting these cancers if they 
underwent prophylactic mastectomy and/or oophorectomy. These 
women could thereby increase their lifespan by an average of 2.9 to 5.3 
years.64 Even in the average woman without these genetic markers, 
prophylactically removing both breasts and ovaries would result in an 
average gain of six to eight months in life expectancy.65 Without providing 
their reasoning, the authors concluded that "prophylactic surgery is 
obviously unreasonable for these women."66 Although such prophylactic 
surgery is generally deemed inappropriate,67 given the substantial benefits 
and assuming fully informed consent could be provided by the patient 
herself, it may be legally and ethically permissible. By contrast, it clearly 
would be impermissible in the case of an incompetent individual, where 
permission would have to be provided by a surrogate.68 
D. How does informed consent work in contexts involving 
incompetent adults? 
Although the doctrine of informed consent is predicated on respect for 
the autonomy of the patient, the doctrine applies even when the patient is 
not competent. The effect of applying the doctrine to incompetent adult 
patients is not to give the physician or anyone else a right to decide for the 
patient.69 Rather, in such cases, under the principle of "substituted 
Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, 
Healthy Tissue from their Infant Children?: the Practice of Circumcision in the 
United States, 7 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 113-14, 119-22 (1998). 
64. See Deborah Schrag et al., Decision Analysis-Effects of Prophylactic 
Mastectomy and Oophrectomy on Life Expectancy among Women with BRCAJ or 
BRCA2 Mutations, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1465, 1465 (1997). 
65. See id. 
66. /d. at 1470. 
67. See id. ("Prophylactic surgery is obviously unreasonable for these 
women."). 
68. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
69. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,661-62 (N.J. 1976). 
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judgment," a surrogate for the patient, typically a relative, is legally 
permitted to stand in the place of the patient; this means that the surrogate 
can make decisions on behalf of the patient in furtherance of the rights of 
the patient. 70 Surrogates are under a legal obligation to decide not on the 
basis of how they want the patient to be treated, but rather on the basis of 
how the patient would choose to be treated if he or she. were capable of 
choosing.71 As a general rule, the more a surrogate seems influenced in 
70. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 421, 431 
(Mass. 1977); see also Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387-390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1972) (declaring the right of court of equity to act for incompetent recognized as 
"doctrine of substituted judgment" which is broad enough to cover all matters 
touching well-being of legally incapacitated persons including infants); Strunk v. 
Strunk 445 S.W.2d 145, 145-149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (permitting a kidney 
transplant from 27-year-old incompetent to his 28-year-old brother based on 
finding that incompetent, who had close relations with recipient, would benefit 
from continuation of recipient's life); In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 
180, 181 (Wis. 1975) (denying request for court application of substituted 
judgment doctrine and grant of permission for 39-year-old man with mental age of 
12 to donate kidney to sister in absence of real consent on his part and in a 
situation where no benefit to him had been established); Mark R. Tonelli, 
Substituted Judgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards on a Sliding Scale, 
25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 22 (1997); L.E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures 
Involving Minors and Incompetents and Misapplication of the Substituted 
Judgment Doctrine, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 107, 107 (1992); Sean M. Dunphy & John 
H. Cross, Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Persons: The Massachusetts 
Substituted Judgment Model, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 153, 153 (1987); Charles H. 
Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and 
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision-Making within the American Family, 
17 FAM. L. Q. 1, 16 (1983). But see William A. Krais, The Incompetent 
Developmentally Disabled Person's Right of Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, 
Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J . L. & MED. 333, 334-35 (1989) 
(rejecting substituted judgment standard and recommending best interests test). 
71. See Ex Parte Whitbread in the Matter of Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 ENG. REP. 
878, 878 (Ch. 1816) ("the Court will act with reference to the Lunatic, and for his 
benefit, as it is probable the Lunatic himself would have acted if of sound mind"); 
see also Belchertown, 370 N.E.2d at 424 ("decision in cases such as this should be 
that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were 
competent."); Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985) ("[the] goal of 
decision-making for incompetent nursing home patients with respect to life-
sustaining treatment should be to determine and effectuate, insofar as possible, 
the decision that the patient would have made if competent."); Conservatorship of 
Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 
(1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 1023 (1988) (holding that incompetent patients 
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her decision-making by her personal values and preferences, the less 
willing a physician should be to accept the surrogate's authorization for a 
procedure. 
· Where the patient was formerly competent, the substitute decision-
makers typically must present clear and convincing evidence as to the 
wishes of the patient before he or she became incompetent.72 For 
example, where a once-competent adult has become disabled by trauma 
or old age and is on life support, in order for a court to authorize 
discontinuation of life support surrogates must demonstrate that, when 
competent, the patient indicated a preference not to have his or her life 
prolonged by medical means if there was no hope of recovery.73 Where 
such evidence is lacking or where the patient was never competent, the 
surrogate must provide evidence as to what a rational person would likely 
want for himself or herself in light of the relevant aspects of the 
situation.74 In other words, the patient's best interests must be proved by 
the surrogate.75 The substitute decision-maker's judgment is subject to 
review and challenge if it appears irrational or self-interested.76 
retain right to have appropriate medical decisions made on their behalf, and an 
appropriate medical decision is one that is made in the patient's best interests as 
opposed to the interests of any other party). 
72. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284-86 (1990) 
(concluding that a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in 
such proceedings and noting that many state courts which have addressed the 
issue have required a clear and convincing standard of proof); cf Matter of Edna 
M.P., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997) (using preponderance of evidence standard); see 
also Lebit, supra note 70, at 107, 110, 127 (cautioning that substituted judgment 
has been "tragically misapplied" to achieve what judges believe to be "beneficial" 
in cases where consent is not available and noting that this results in the confusion 
of the standards of best interests and substituted judgment). 
73. See Matter of Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981); see also S. Williams, 
Substituted Judgment in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Persons: In re 
Storar, 61 WIS. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (1982). 
74. See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (N.J. 1981) (requiring clear and 
convincing proof to justify sterilization of nineteen-year-old woman afflicted with 
Down's syndrome). 
75. See Matter of C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981) (requiring clear 
and convincing standard); Matter of A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76 (Colo. 1981) 
(requiring clear and convincing standard of proof that procedure "medically 
essential"); Matter of Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. 1982) (requiring clear 
and convincing standard). 
76. Neil M. Lazar et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 5. Substitute Decision-
Making, 155 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 1435 (1996). 
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The question whether to perform a medical procedure on an adult who 
has never been competent arises most often when mentally disabled 
women have guardians who wish to sterilize them.77 These guardians 
typically believe that sterilization will benefit the disabled women by 
preventing a pregnancy that could have serious physical, psychological 
and social consequences.78 Nevertheless, in light of the presumption of 
bodily integrity and the difficulty of attributing contrary preferences to an 
adult who has never been competent, courts and legislators have become 
increasingly unwilling to allow such sterilization.79 
In general, to authorize surgery on an incompetent adult patient, a 
surrogate must clearly demonstrate that the benefits of the surgery 
outweigh the short- and long-term costs for the patient. The incompetent 
person's presumptive right against invasion of his or her bodily integrity 
places the burden on anyone who would infringe that right to prove that it 
is necessary for the incompetent person's welfare. Importantly, the costs 
and benefits relevant to an assessment of an incompetent person's 
interests in connection with a medical procedure are only temporal, 
earthly interests such as physical and mental health, social relationships 
and finances. Assessment of costs and benefits on behalf of an 
incompetent person cannot justifiably include what the surrogate 
decision-maker believes to be spiritual or other worldly costs and benefits 
for the patient. There is no assurance that the patient would share that 
perception. The law gives no one authority to decide what another 
person's spiritual interests are, regardless of whether the latter person is 
or ever has been competent.80 This principle is rarely tested, but in In re 
Quinlan,81 which involved a once-competent woman in a persistent 
vegetative state, the New Jersey Supreme Court invoked the principle to 
reject a claim by the woman's parents that the hospital must withdraw life 
support because the claim was inconsistent with the parents' religious 
77. See Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 311-12 (Ala. 1979) (holding that in 
absence of statutory authority, court lacks power to order sterilization of retarded 
16-year-old female); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366-67 (Conn. 1978) 
(finding that parents lack authority either to veto or to give valid consent to 
sterilization of their several mentally retarded and physically handicapped 
daughters). 
78. See Hudson, 373 So. 2d at 311-12; Ruby, 452 F. Supp. at 366-67. 
79. See Hudson, 373 So. 2d at 311-12; Ruby, 452 F. Supp. at 366-67. 
80. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,661-62 (N.J. 1976). 
81. Jd. 
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values.82 The court stated emphatically that the parents had no right, 
based on religious freedom or parenthood, to make that decision for their 
83 daughter. 
Within these constraints the surrogate is legally authorized to grant 
permission (the more precise terminology) to medical intervention for an 
incompetent adult. However, for a competent adult making decisions 
regarding his own care, such permission must be informed. The 
physician's professional and legal duties in this context are at least as 
stringent as in the case of an autonomous adult. Because the patient-the 
person with the greatest stake in the operation-is not able himself to 
insist upon receiving and then evaluating all the relevant information, 
more care must be taken to ensure that decisions are made in the correct 
way. Hence, when a surrogate is faced with a decision on whether an 
incompetent adult should undergo surgery, medical personnel have a duty 
to the patient to fully disclose to the surrogate all available information 
that a reasonable, competent adult would want before deciding whether 
to undergo the procedure.84 Physicians also have a duty to ensure that the 
surrogate is capable of understanding the information provided and of 
fully appreciating the consequences of a decision at the moment of 
decision-making. Likewise, physicians also have an obligation not to 
manipulate the surrogate by presenting the information in a manner 
designed to secure permission, rather than facilitating an objective 
evaluation of the risks and benefits of the procedure. In addition to these 
requirements, which also arise in securing informed consent from a 
competent patient, a physician seeking permission for a surgical 
procedure on an incompetent adult must ensure that the substitute 
decision-maker is not acting out of self-interest but rather is deciding on 
the basis of what is best for the patient. 
E. Would non-medically indicated surgery be allowed for a non-
autonomous adult? 
There are few situations in which a surrogate for an incompetent adult 
requests a non-medically indicated procedure. The most common are 
similar to the cases indicated above in which a concerned family member 
seeks to withdraw life support from a patient who is terminally ill or in a 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking 
the Doctrine of Parents' Right, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1416-21, 1429-32 (1994). 
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persistent vegetative state, or to take away a mentally disabled woman's 
ability to procreate.85 In all of these situations, the surrogate may perceive 
non-medical benefits for the patient that he or she believes outweigh any 
medical harm that might result from the decision. However, there is no 
assurance that the views of surrogates, often close family members, will 
necessarily be the same as the patient's had he or she been confronted 
with the situation while competent. 86 As noted above, surrogates in both 
cases must present strong evidence as to the patient's preferences when 
competent or as to the patient's best interests. 
With respect to the choice of physically invasive procedures, such as 
sterilization, courts and legislatures have been increasingly resistant to 
allow them and increasingly concerned that surrogates might choose such 
procedures out of self-interest rather than out of respect for the 
incompetent adult. In several states, sterilization is simply not 
permitted.87 A doctor today who performs a sterilization operation on an 
85. See Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to 
the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from the Infant Children?: the 
Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 87, 
107-08 (1998) (emphasizing the strong similarity between sterilization of 
incompetents and infant circumcision: both involve surgery on the genitals, since 
incompetents are treated by the law as minors the parens patriae power applies 
equally to incompetents and infants, both procedures viol'ate the minor's personal 
integrity, and while sterilization invokes profound privacy interests in procreative 
choice not raised by circumcision, circumcision "does involve the radical alteration 
of a male's most sensitive and private body part which is surely a protected 
privacy interest."). 
86. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285-86 (1990). 
87. In some States, sterilization is prohibited by statute where a mentally 
disabled woman is capable of participating in the decision making process and 
declines to consent. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-128(4) (2000). In at 
least one state, California, the legislature initially passed a statute prohibiting 
sterilization under any circumstances, but a court ruled the prohibition 
unconstitutional, on the grounds that incompetent women have reproductive 
rights that include a right to be sterilized if they want to be and if that is in their 
best interests. See In re ValerieN., 707 P.2d 760, 771-72 (Cal. 1985) (invalidating 
Ann. Cal. Probate Code § 2356(d)). More commonly, courts have held that 
sterilization of mentally incompetent women is prohibited in the absence of 
statutory authority. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 126 (1996); 
Elizabeth Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights 
and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L. J. 806, 817 n.32 (1986). States that do permit 
courts to authorize sterilization generally require that courts find by clear and 
convincing evidence that sterilization is in the best interests of the incompetent 
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incompetent woman without court approval is vulnerable to criminal, civil 
and professional ethics charges, despite having permission from the 
woman's parents or other guardians.88 Typically, if a court chooses to 
grant approval of the procedure at all, it is only after a determination 
"that the condition of the conservatee 'requires the recommended course 
of medical treatment,"' and that there are no alternative means of 
protecting the incompetent woman's physical well-being and interests.89 
Consistent with this approach, the California Supreme Court found in 
Conservatorship of Valerie N. 90 that parents of a mentally retarded woman 
could not have her sterilized, "inasmuch as there was neither evidence of 
necessity ... nor sufficient evidence that less intrusive means ... [were] 
not presently available to [the conservatee]."91 The Court based its 
decision upon the incompetent patient's fundamental "right ... to be free 
of intrusive medical and surgical procedures."92 
Unsurprisingly, courts have not been faced with claims by guardians to 
have incompetent adults in their care undergo surgery to remove a 
normal healthy, non-diseased, uninjured part of the body simply for the 
sake of conforming to cultural norms or as a prophylactic measure to 
avoid some infinitesimal risk of disease to that part of the body. Were a 
guardian of an adult to seek such a procedure, doctors and lawyers would 
inform him without hesitation that his request is inappropriate and legally 
unsupportable. Imagine, for example, Muslim parents of a woman who 
was never competent asking a doctor to circumcise her; the doctor surely 
must refuse. Courts have even been hesitant when removal of healthy 
tissue has been sought for the purpose of transplantation- that is, to 
provide a medical benefit to (perhaps even save the life of) another 
person who may be a close relative of the incompetent adult. They have 
woman. See Scott, supra, at 817-19. Many require that all less drastic 
(rtonpermanent) contraceptive methods have been found unworkable and that 
there be no alternative to sterilization. See id. at 820 n.43. Significantly, current 
law precludes courts from considering the interests of parents or other guardians 
for the incompetent woman in deciding whether to authorize sterilization. See id. 
at 821-22. 
88. See ReB (a Minor), 2 All E.R. 206, 206, 214-15 (H.L. 1987); see generally 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-86. 
89. See Valerie N., 707 P.2d at 771-72 (citing Ann. Cal. Probate Code § 
2356(d) (1980)) (emphasis added). 
90. Id. 
91. See id. at 405. 
92. See id. at 403. 
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held that surrogates may not authorize this type of removal because it 
does not constitute medical treatment for the incompetent donor.93 In 
many such cases, an objective analysis would probably show that a 
transplant would maximize the overall good and that the average 
competent person would altruistically agree to donate the tissue or organ, 
but the law nevertheless prohibits that result because of grave concerns 
about violating a person's physical integrity without his consent. 
The American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics does not 
address a physician's ethical obligation in situations where guardians for 
an incompetent adult seek non-medically indicated medical intervention. 
However, the Code includes a more general mandate to physicians to help 
patients "make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent 
with good medical practice."94 This might be read to imply that a physician 
must discourage a surrogate from seeking a procedure that would not be 
medically beneficial to the patient. Certainly, physicians have no 
affirmative obligation to undertake a non-medically indicated 
intervention when asked to do so. Therefore, it is no justification for 
violating an incompetent person's physical integrity that a surrogate asked 
the physician to do so.95 
There is also little mention in the legal or ethical literature of 
physician's proposing non-medically indicated procedures to surrogates 
who have not themselves requested the procedure. This is unsurprising. 
Such a practice would so clearly offend the canons of ethics of the medical 
profession as to generate a reaction of horror and recrimination by legal 
and medical authorities. The prohibition of solicitation by doctors, based 
upon the impropriety of a physician putting his or her financial welfare 
above the welfare of the patient,96 would apply even more stringently to 
solicitation of surrogates for incompetent adults than it does to 
solicitation of competent adults. Any physician who proposed to a 
surrogate for an incompetent adult that the surrogate grant permission for 
non-medically indicated surgery which the surrogate had not requested 
would jeopardize his or her license to practice medicine. 
93. See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 493-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re 
Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 185-87 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
94. See AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 37, at 120 (emphasis 
added) . 
95. Charles Weijer et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 16. Dealing with Demands 
for Inappropriate Treatment, 159 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 817 (1998). 
96. See AMA, supra note 37, at 105; Can. Med. Ass'n, supra note 38, at 
1176A-B. 
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Ill. CHILDREN 
A. How does consent currently work in contexts involving children? 
Parents traditionally have made most medical decisions for their minor 
children. Like surrogate decision-making for incompetent adults, 
parental permission for medical procedures on children, when 
appropriate and properly secured, constitutes an exception to the general 
requirement of personal consent to medical treatment.97 Except in an 
emergency, informed permission by parents is generally required to 
perform any medical procedure on a child; otherwise, the procedure 
would be tortious and probably a criminal assault.98 
In turn, the authority of parents is circumscribed by the welfare of their 
children; they may not make decisions for their children that are likely to 
cause them physical harm or otherwise impair their healthy 
development.99 As the rights of children as distinct persons have been 
increasingly recognized in modern times, children's welfare has become 
an overriding constraint on their medical care, limiting parental 
discretion.100 The Queensland Law Reform Commission forcefully stated 
the limits on parental power to grant permission for children's medical 
treatment as follows: 
A parent has no authority to consent to the medical treatment 
of his or her child unless it is in the best interests of the child. 
This is because implicit in parental consent is understood to be 
the determination of what is best for the welfare of the child. If 
a parent purports to consent to a treatment which is not in the 
best interests of the child, the consent is of no effect and any 
person acting on such consent would be guilty of assault if any 
physical interference is involved.101 
97. See Secretary, Dept. of Health & Comm. Serv. v. J.W.B. & S.M.B. 
[Marion's Case] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 218,235-237 (Austl.). 
98. See Keeton, supra note 8, at § 18; Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 
(D.C. Cir. 1941); see also Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decision-Making for Children: 
An Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 689,689 (1982). 
99. See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 1355; Bonner & Kinane, supra note 3, at S1-
S2. 
100. See Marion's Case, 175 C.L.R. at 240; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 167 (1944). 
101. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, CONSENT TO MEDICAL 
TREATMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE: DISCUSSION PAPER 34-35 (1995) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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Today, courts clearly have power to insert themselves into decision-
making on behalf of children.102 "Under the doctrine of parens patriae, 
the state has a right, indeed a duty, to protect children. State officials may 
interfere in family matters to safeguard the child's health, educational 
development and emotional well being." 103 Thus, the principal limit on 
parents' decision-making is a legal and moral requirement that they act in 
the best interests of their children, which triggers state action when 
parents demonstrably act contrary to interests of the child, as defined by 
the state. 
B. Parents may not sacrifice their children's physical well being for 
the sake of religious belief 
When parents make decisions about their children's medical care that 
are inconsistent with their children's well-being-that is, decisions not 
within the range of reasonable alternatives-they commit child abuse or 
neglect and can be charged accordingly in civil and/or criminal 
proceedings. Just as is true of adult incompetents, surrogate decisions for 
children must rest on the temporal interests of the patient, not on 
supposed spiritual or other worldly interests of the patient or of the 
surrogate. Thus, parents are neither excused from their obligation to 
secure necessary medical care for their children nor from their obligation 
to protect their child's physical integrity from unwarranted medical 
procedures simply because they have religious beliefs inconsistent with 
the child's temporal well being.104 
102. See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 1355; see also J.L. Rosato, Putting Square 
Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing 
Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parent, 29 U.S. FED. L. REV. 43 
(1994). 
103. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
104. See id.; see also In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1389 (Ohio 1986) 
(ruling that parents' constitutional rights must yield to state authority because 
"the faith of the parents, as firm and clear as it is, does not permit them, under the 
law of this state and the nation, to expose [their child] to progressive ill health and 
death); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. 1983) (finding that "humane 
considerations and life-saving attempts" in favor of child outweighed father's 
interest in unlimited practice of his religion); People ex rei. D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 
(Colo. 1982); (holding that when parents refuse medical treatment for their child 
on religious grounds, the state can meet its heavy burden of proof necessary to 
override parents' constitutional objections by demonstrating that the child is 
suffering from a life-threatening medical condition for which there is medical 
treatment available); In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53, 57-59 (Fla. 1975) (concluding that 
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Numerous judicial decisions have addressed parental power to refuse 
medically indicated procedures that are contrary to parents' religious 
beliefs. The reigning legal principle was announced by the United States 
Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts:105 "Parents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, in 
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they 
have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that 
choice for themselves."106 This principle is controlling regardless of 
whether the child's life is in danger: parents are always required by law to 
proceed in accordance with their child's best interests.107 In fact, 
sometimes courts do not require any actual harm to justify compelling a 
medical procedure that parents have refused on religious grounds. 108 The 
prevailing rule is that the state properly overrides parental objections to 
care when necessary to avoid physical harm to the child.109 For example, 
the court is not precluded in case where child's life is threatened from ordering 
medical services or treatment even where contrary to parents' wishes); Jehovah's 
Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 505 (W.D. Wash. 1967) 
(finding that state statutes empowering superior court judges to declare children 
dependent for purpose of authorizing blood transfusions of children against 
parents' religious objections not invalid under United States Constitution), affd 
per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Paterson, 320 A.2d 518 
(N.J. 1974) (ordering necessary blooci transfusions for child when parents' refusal, 
based on religious beliefs, created danger of grave and irreparable brain damage 
but not death); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ohio 1962) (concluding that 
"when a child's right to live and his parents' religious belief collide, the former is 
paramount, and the religious doctrine must give way"); Commonwealth v. 
Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. 1985) (deciding that for purposes of 
involuntary homicide statute, parents had no choice but to get medical help, 
despite their religious beliefs, where they faced condition which threatened and 
eventually ended child's life). 
105. 321 u.s. 158 (1944). 
106. !d. at 170. 
107. See, e.g., O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); In re 
Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1976); In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972); In re Sampson, 
317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), affd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1971), affd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972). 
· 108. See In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling 
that despite absence of actual harm, threat of harm if child was not periodically 
monitored for cancer was sufficient to permit juvenile court's jurisdiction to order 
monitoring). 
109. See generally In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1991) (ruling that 
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in Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital/ 10 the United States 
Supreme Court, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, upheld per curiam a 
Washington federal district court decision that the State of Washington 
properly ordered necessary blood transfusions for a child whose parents 
objected to the transfusions on religious grounds.m 
Moreover, in recent years the very notion of parental entitlement has 
been increasingly questioned. Recognition of and respect for children as 
persons distinct from their parents has grown, leading legal scholars and 
judges to insist that parenthood is a fiduciary role rather than a property-
owning one, so that parental authority should be viewed as a limited 
privilege rather than as a right.112 In addition, there has been growing 
support for the view that children themselves possess rights in connection 
with their upbringing, 113 and that those rights constrain the freedom of 
114 parents as well as the power of the state. 
best interests of child, coupled with state's strong interest in securing a life-saving 
blood transfusion, outweighed parents' constitutional objections); State v. 
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (holding 
court-ordered blood transfusion did not violate parents' constitutional rights of 
religion or parental autonomy when the child's life was in danger); Wallace v. 
Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (finding that 
when parents refuse medical treatment for their child, the lack of which will 
almost certainly cause death or, at best, lifelong mental impairment, the child is 
neglected and the court may order the necessary treatment without violating the 
parents' constitutional rights); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952) 
(holding that state has power to preserve child's life and health when medical 
treatment is as necessary for that child's survival as is food); Commonwealth v. 
Cottam, 616 A.2d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (ruling that in criminal case 
against defendant parents over death of children due to neglect, validity and 
sincerity of religious beliefs of defendants and children are not relevant to issues 
presented in trial for failing in legal duty to provide for children, resulting in 
starvation death of son and severe malnutrition of daughter); see generally Dwyer, 
supra note 3, at 1355-56. 
110. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.O. Wash. 1967), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 
(1968). 
111. Jd. at 504-05. 
112. See W. Riddick, Parents and Life Prospects, in HAVING CHILDREN: 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25 (0. O'Neill & W. 
Riddick eds. 1979); see generally Dwyer, supra note 84, at 1374-76. 
113. JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
OTHERS 37 (1984); see generally JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998). 
114. See James G. Dwyer, supra note 84, at 1429-31; see also Josette M. 
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In light of the established limits on parental authority and freedom and 
the current trend toward greater protection of children against 
inappropriate parental decision-making, medical personnel cannot simply 
comply with parental preferences for, or against, a given procedure even 
when those preferences are grounded in religious belief. As with 
incompetent adults, the physician owes duties to the child patient himself 
and those duties in some circumstances require resisting or even refusing 
LeDoux, Interspousal Liability and the Wrongful Transmission of HIV-AIDS: An 
Argument for Broadening Legal A venues for the Injured Spouse and Further 
Expanding Children's Rights to Sue Their Parents, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 392 
(2000) ("the trend in recent law is to recognize a growing need to grant children 
new rights in order that they may seek legal redress from transgressing parents"); 
see also Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: 
Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (1994) 
(noting that "the new cycle of litigation involving children reflects an additional 
pattern of greater state involvement in protecting children, an intervention which 
can pose a significant intrusion into family life"). For a sampling of law review 
articles in recent years arguing for greater rights of children as against their 
parents in particular contexts, see Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our 
Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of 
Children, 36.31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 (1998) (arguing that children have a 
right not to be corporally punished by their parents); Marsha Garrison, An 
Evaluation of Two Models of Pareiual Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REv. 41 (1998) 
(arguing for a right of children to a greater share of family resources following 
divorce than they currently receive); Elizabeth A. Lingle, Treating Children By 
Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 301, 330 (1996) (arguing 
against spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical neglect laws); Ann 
MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decision-
Making for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
725, 739 (1994) (arguing against spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical 
neglect laws); Therese Powers, Race For Perfection: Children's Rights and 
Enhancement Drugs, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 141, 165-167 (1998-99) (arguing for a right 
of children to receive Ritalin and Human Growth Hormone despite the objection 
of their parents); Melinda A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conflict: Between 
Liberty and Responsibility, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 485 (1996) 
(arguing for greater liberty rights for children as against the interests and wishes of 
parents in a variety of situations). For evidence of the medical professions 
commitment to protecting the welfare of children even as against the wishes of 
parents in other contexts, see American Academy of Pediatrics, Religious 
Objections to Medical Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279, 279 (1997) (stating AAP 
opposition to spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical neglect laws); 
Andrew Skolnick, Religious Exemptions to Child Neglect Laws Still Being Passed 
Despite Convictions of Parents, 264 JAMA 1226, 1233 (1990) (stating opposition 
of AMAto spiritual treatment exemptions to child medical neglect laws). 
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surrogates' choices.115 Those duties may be conceptualized as requiring 
medical professionals to ensure that parents are making the same decision 
that the child would make if able to do so, or as requiring medical 
professionals to ensure that parental choices are consistent with what 
objectively is in the child's best interests. In other words, the professional 
obligation owed to a child patient is the same as that owed an 
incompetent adult patient. 
C. Parents may authorize a non-medically indicated procedure only 
if it is clearly in the child's best interests 
Where parents request a procedure that is not medically indicated, 
courts have taken an even more child-protective stance and required 
strong evidence that the procedure is in the patient-child's interests. 
Sometimes courts allow the child's best interests to be determined using 
the more subjective, substituted judgment standard.116 On other occasions 
courts insist on the more objective, "best interests" approach, presumably 
because the substituted judgment approach might allow parents 
inappropriately to inject their own preferences into the decision-making 
117 process. 
While theoretically clear, the distinction between the two standards has 
a definite tendency to sometimes blur in practice, as courts have 
demonstrated by invoking the "best interests" language while applying an 
analytical approach more consonant with the substituted judgment 
approach.118 As with incompetent adults, courts do not permit procedures 
115. See Christine Harrison et al., Bioethics for Clinicians: 9. Involving 
Children in Medical Decisions, 156 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 825,827-828 (1997). 
116. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-149 (Ky. 1969); Little v. Little, 
576 S.W.2d at 497-98; Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d at 387-88; Foody v. Manchester 
Mem. Hasp., 482 A.2d 713, 720-21 (Conn. Super. 1984); In re Estate of Longeway, 
549 N.E.2d 292, 298-300 (Ill. 1989). 
117. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hasp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1253-54 
(Md. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983) (applying best interests doctrine to 
bar sterilization of an incompetent thirteen year old girl); Curran v. Bosze, 566 
N.E.2d 1319, 1325-1331 (Ill. 1990); see generally Re Jane (1988) 85 A.L.R. 409 
(holding parental consent by itself insufficient to authorize hysterectomy on 
severely mentally disabled but physically healthy seventeen-year-old woman 
despite apparently good-faith desire to protect her from problems in coping with 
menstruation and possible pregnancy); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 483-86 (N.J. 
1981); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973). 
118. See, e.g, Matter of Doe, 104 A.D.2d 200, 200-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) 
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to be performed on children when the procedures will only benefit other 
people and not the patient.119 This is true even in cases where the 
potential benefit to a close relative substantially exceeds the risk to the 
child-patient, and where one might therefore reasonably assume many 
competent patients would choose to undergo the procedure. For 
example, in Little v. Little120 the guardian ad litem for a 14-year-old 
mentally incompetent, but otherwise perfectly healthy girl applied on the 
encouragement of the girl's mother for an order authorizing the mother to 
grant permission for the removal of a kidney from the girl. 121 The purpose 
of the procedure was to transplant the kidney into the girl's brother who 
was suffering from end-stage renal disease. In refusing the request, the 
Texas Court of Appeals stated that "[t]his power of parents ... to consent 
to surgical intrusions upon the person of the minor ... is limited to the 
(applying substituted judgment analysis to uphold trial court's finding "to 
reasonable certainty" that bone marrow transplant was in incompetent donor's 
"best interests" due to benefits of future company and advocacy provided by 
donee brother's companionship, which were found to outweigh any physical and 
psychological risk); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1202 (Ill. 1990) 
(involving petition for leave to discontinue artificial feeding and hydration of ward 
in chronically vegetative state, a determination by anyone else of best interests of 
ward cannot govern . ward's imputed choice; if this were permissible, "the 
substituted-judgment procedure would be vitiated by a best-interests guardianship 
standard, elevating other parties' assessments of the meaning and value of life 
over the affected individual's own common Jaw right to refuse medical 
treatment"); see also Lebit, supra note 70, at 108 ("Over time courts have come to 
confuse the best interests standard with the substituted judgment doctrine in 
certain situations and apply the substituted judgment doctrine to cases in which it 
is not appropriate"). 
119. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121,123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (concluding that 
skin graft from 15-year-old boy performed without informed consent from him or 
his mother was entirely for the benefit of the graft recipient and involved sacrifice 
by the boy, violating the basic consideration of whether the proposed operation is 
for the benefit of the child); see also In reA. C., 573 A.2d at 1247 (finding that to 
protect right to bodily integrity against intrusion by others, courts must determine 
the patient's wishes by any means available and must abide by these wishes unless 
truly extraordinary or compelling reasons exist to override them); see generally 
Krais, supra note 70, at 333-361 (rejecting substituted judgment standard and 
recommending best interests test); see also Lebit, supra note 70 at 111-12; L.K. 
Gregory, Propriety of Surgically Invading Incompetent or Minor for Benefit of 
Third Party, 4 A.L.R. 5th 1000 (1992); Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment 
Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 131 (1985). 
120. 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
121. See id. at 493-95. 
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power to consent to medical 'treatment."'122 In other words, the 
permission is limited to care for an injury, disease or malformation. 
Similarly, in In re Richardson/23 a Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled that 
kidney transplant surgery from a mentally retarded child to his sister 
could not take place because it would contravene the "minor's right to be 
free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of the loss of an 
organ unless such loss be in the best interest of the minor."124 The 
Richardson court rejected the substituted judgment test in favor of the 
best interest test and concluded that the procedure was not in the 
prospective donor's interest, because any direct benefit was highly 
speculative.125 In Curran v. Bosze,126 the Illinois Supreme Court likewise 
rejected the substituted judgment approach in a case involving a proposal 
to subject three-and-one-half-year-old twins to blood testing to determine 
bone marrow compatibility with their half-brother, who was dying of 
leukemia, reasoning that it was impermissibly speculative for a court of 
law or anyone else to attempt to ascertain the future intentions of such 
young children.127 Most recently, and in a dramatic endorsement of the 
best interests principle, an English Court of Appeals refused to allow 
parents of Siamese twin girls to undertake the separation of the twins, 
where one severely brain-damaged twin was virtually sure to die as a 
result of the procedure, but where in the absence of the procedure both 
twins would almost certainly lose their lives within a few years.128 The 
court held that parental consent may only be given for treatment which is 
in the best interests of the child, and that in this case the treatment was 
not in the weaker child's best interest.129 
Parents, like substitute decision-makers for incompetent adult patients, 
should be viewed as agents for their children, required to make decisions 
regarding medical interventions for their children in a manner consistent 
122. See id. 
123. 284 So. 2d 185. 
124. See id. at 185-87. 
125. See id. at 187; but cf Matter of Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984). 
126. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990). 
127. See id. at 1325-31. 
128. A (Children), Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division), at§§ 11.7 and 11.8, http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/info/news_items/ 
siamese.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2000). 
129. /d. at §§ III.3 and III.S. 
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with their children's best interests. 130 Medical professionals owe a duty to 
their minor patients to assist parents in making decisions that conform to 
that standard. A recent statement of the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (AAP) Committee on Bioethics supports the conclusion that 
physicians are constrained in accepting parental direction regarding 
medical care for children by the requirement that the care be medically 
beneficial and that any surgery upon children must be necessary to 
prevent serious harm. According to the AAP Committee, parental 
permission for medical intervention can substitute for the child's consent 
only in situations of clear and immediate medical necessity, such as 
disease, trauma or deformity.131 The AAP Committee directs that for 
non-essential treatments, particularly those that can be deferred without 
loss of efficacy, the physician and family wait until the child's consent can 
be obtained.132 The medical profession in the United Kingdom adheres to 
similar rules. The United Kingdom Department of Health's guidelines 
state that 
[t)hose acting for the child can only legally give their consent 
provided that the intervention is for the benefit of the child. If 
they are responsible for allowing the child to be subjected to any 
risk (other than one so insignificant as to be negligible) that is 
not outweighed by the prospect of medical benefit to the child, 
they act illegally .133 
To assist parents in making decisions that comport with their child's best 
interests, medical professionals must satisfy the same requirements of 
informed consent/parental permission that apply to decision-making by 
competent adults and by surrogates for incompetent adults. First, the 
physician must disclose to parents all relevant information that a 
competent patient would want to know if the procedure were to be 
performed on him. Second, the physician must ensure that parents have 
the capacity to understand and think rationally about the information 
given to them. Third, the physician must ensure that the parents' decision 
is voluntary and not manipulated in any way by the manner in which the 
information is presented or the time at which parents' permission is 
sought. With respect to interventions that are not medically indicated, it 
130. See Dwyer, supra note 84, at 1406-23. 
131. Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and 
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314,314-16 (1995). 
132. ld. 
133. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES, 
Department of Health, Local Research Ethics Committees,§ 4.4, London (1991). 
92 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:61 
is improper at any time for a physician to suggest the procedure to parents 
who have not inquired about it; such a suggestion would amount to 
solicitation and would likely be interpreted by parents as a medical 
recommendation. Just as it would be unethical for a physician to 
recommend a non-medically indicated intervention to the surrogate of an 
incompetent adult, it is also unethical to recommend such an intervention 
to the surrogate of a child. 
IV. CIRCUMCISION: A SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE CONSENT 
DOCTRINE 
The foregoing discussion of medical consent in general and in the 
special case of parental permission for procedures on children yields a 
framework for analyzing circumcision. For simplicity, the analysis below 
is limited to the standard case of neonatal circumcision on newborn boys 
with normal genitalia. In 1999, history was made when a United Kingdom 
family court addressed on the merits a proposed circumcision of a five-
year-old boy for religious reasons and unambiguously concluded that an 
order for circumcision would not be granted as circumcision did not 
satisfy the "paramountcy of welfare" standard, i.e., it was not in the best 
interests of the child.134 Due in part to the pervasive presence of neonatal 
circumcision in American society, no case addressing the validity of 
parental permission for a routine circumcision has ever been decided in a 
United States court. Instead, courts have repeatedly demonstrated their 
determination to avoid any confrontation with the legal issues raised by 
neonatal circumcision. In 1987, a lawsuit challenging the legal validity of 
parental permission for neonatal circumcision was denied by a California 
trial court and subsequently affirmed by the state appeals court.135 The 
California Supreme Court denied the petition for review.136 More 
134. See Re J (Child's Religious Upbringing and Circumcision), [1999] 2 
F.L.R. 678 (Fam. Div.), affirmed, [2000] 1 F.L.R. 571 (C.A.). The Family Division 
decision is also available at http://www.butterworths.co.uk/academic/ 
fortin/cases/Re_J.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2000). 
135. London v. Glassner, California Court of Appeal, 1st District, No. 
A032040 (unpublished, petition for review denied); see also R. Morris, The First 
Circumcision Case, THE TRUTH SEEKER 47 (July/August, 1989). 
136. London v. Glassner, supra note 135. Adam London brought the case via 
his mother, who acted as guardian ad litem. The consent form signed by the 
mother stated that neonatal circumcision had no medical purpose. The issue 
before the court was whether a parent could grant permission for a surgical 
procedure that had no medical purpose. 
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recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's 
invocation of lack of standing as a justification for refusing to consider a 
mother's claim on behalf of her son who was circumcised with his father's 
consent, but without her consent.137 
Currently, an ongoing contest in New Jersey is attracting national 
interest which - like Re J - involves two divorcing parents with opposite 
desires regarding circumcision of their male child, three-year-old Matthew 
Price. The Price case, in which unlike the British case neither parent 
claims any religious motives for their desires regarding the circumcision of 
their son, may in the end become the first recorded American case 
directly addressing the viability of parental consent to circumcision. 
Already, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ordered the .trial court to 
hold a rehearing in the matter, and has appointed an experienced 
children's rights attorney as guardian ad litem.138 
Despite well-settled precedent supporting the viability of such a claim, 
which though technically moot is "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review,"139 the court ruled, based on the fact that the plaintiff had already 
had a circumcision performed, that no remedy existed for the plaintiff and 
the court could not protect him from being circumcised. 
Because there is no possibility of obtaining consent from the patient, 
the issues then become whether parents can give effective permission for 
the procedure, and what legal and ethical obligations doctors may have in 
this situation. Doctors do have a strict obligation to ensure that parents 
receive all material information relating to the risks and benefits of 
circumcision in a manner that they can comprehend, that any parent 
giving permission is fully competent to evaluate the information provided 
and the treatment's potential consequences, and that parents are not in 
any way unduly influenced by the manner or timing of the disclosure. 
The requirements for surrogates are in some respects more stringent 
than those affecting a patient's own consent. While in certain 
circumstances patients may themselves be able to provide legally valid 
consent to prophylactic removal of their own healthy tissue, parents can 
137. See Fishbeck v. North Dakota, 115 F.3d 580, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1997). The 
plaintiffs attempted to challenge a North Dakota law (N.D. Cent. Code§ 12.1-36-
01 (1997)) prohibiting female genital mutilation on the grounds that the law was 
unconstitutional for lack of equal protection of males. 
138. C. Shoemaker, Baby M. Lawyer Joins Case on Circumcision, 
[Bridgewater, New Jersey] Courier News, Nov. 4, 2000, at Dl. 
139. SeeS. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 
515 (1911); see also, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). 
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never grant permission for prophylactic removal of healthy tissue from 
their children. The benefits of the proposed procedure must clearly 
outweigh short - and long-term disadvantages, and spiritual costs and 
benefits may not be incorporated into this analysis. The decision must be 
made solely for the patient's own benefit; even potentially life-saving 
assistance for a close family member cannot justify violating a non-
consenting patient's right to be free of intrusive medical procedures. 
Parents should thus be able to give effective permission for 
circumcision, and doctors should be permitted to perform a circumcision, 
only if the procedure is medically necessary, providing urgently needed 
medical benefits clearly outweigh any attendant costs. As we shall see, 
the evidence does not support routine circumcision. 
A. Does routine circumcision provide urgently needed medical 
benefits? 
Circumcision does not correct an existing injury, disease or harmful 
malfunction. Thus, even if circumcision provides some medical benefit, 
there is no urgency to perform the procedure. General ethical and legal 
principles concerning surgery on children therefore dictate that the 
decision whether a male will be circumcised must be suspended until the 
male is capable of making the decision himself. This is even clearer if 
claimed medical benefits would not be realized until adulthood. 
At most, some contend that circumcision is a prophylactic measure, to 
prevent urinary tract infection (UTI) in boys, penile cancer and sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs) in adult males. 140 Thus, the only claimed 
benefit that males would realize before adulthood is a reduced rate of 
UTI. It cannot plausibly be maintained that this is an urgently needed 
medical benefit. Moreover, even if urgency were not required, and even if 
the claimed prophylactic benefit were significant, that benefit would, at a 
minimum, have to clearly outweigh any harm that circumcision might 
cause in order to overcome the general, well-established presumption 
against incursion on a non-consenting person's physical integrity. 
In addition, as explained below, the claims that circumcision has 
prophylactic value have been essentially refuted. These claims are the 
latest in a long history of claimed benefits from circumcision that have 
proven to be illusory. In 1896, for example, the medical profession 
contended that circumcision helps avoid "phimosis, paraphimosis, 
140. Edgar J. Schoen, Wiswell TE, Moses S., New Policy on Circumcision-
Cause for Concern, 105 PEDIATRICS 620, 620-23 (2000). 
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redundancy (where the prepuce more than covers the glans), adhesions, 
papillomata, eczema (acute and chronic), oedema, chancre, chancroid, 
cicatrices, inflammatory thickening, elephantiasis, naevus, epithelioma, 
gangrene, tuberculosis, preputial calculi, hip-joint disease, hernia, ... 
[o]nanism, seminal emissions, enuresis, dysuria, retention, general 
nervousness, impotence, convulsions, hystero-epilepsy."141 All of these 
claims were ultimately shown to lack scientific foundation. More recent 
justifications likewise have been shown to lack scientific merit. 142 The 
evidence regarding the current claims is evaluated below. 
1. Phimosis, balanitis, and hygiene concerns do not justify 
routine circumcision 
Although commonly given as justifications for neonatal circumcision, 143 
there is no scientific evidence to support these claims. The incidence of 
phimosis following circumcision (0.3% to 1.0% )144 is approximately the 
same as for males never circumcised (0.6% to 0.9%).145 In comparative 
studies the incidence of phimosis and balanitis was not significantly 
different between those circumcised and those not circumcised.146 
While it has likewise been asserted that a circumcised penis is more 
hygienic, no studies in the medical literature exist to support such a claim. 
To the contrary, circumcised boys under the age of three years have been 
found to have more problems associated with poor hygiene than intact 
141. See Editor, Circumscisus, 49 MED. REC. 430,430 (1896). 
142. See FREDERICK HODGES, A Short History of the Institutionalization of 
Involuntary Sexual Mutilation in the United States, in SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: A 
HUMAN TRAGEDY 17-40 (G.C. Denniston & M.F. Milos eds. 1997). 
143. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Report of the Task Force on 
Circumcision, 84 PEDIATRICS 388,388,390 (1989). 
144. See Yosef A . Kaweblum et al., Circumcision Using the Mogen Clamp, 23 
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 679, 681-82 (1984); see also R.S. Van Howe, Variability in 
Penile Appearance and Penile Findings: A Prospective Study, 80 BRIT. J . 
UROLOGY 776 (1997). 
145. See K.R. Shankar & A.M.K. Rickwood, The Incidence of Phimosis in 
Boys, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 101, 101 (1999); see also A.M.K. Rickwood et al., 
Phimosis in Boys, 52 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 147 (1980). 
146. See D.M. Fergusson et al., Neonatal Circumcision and Penile Problems: 
An 8-year Longitudinal Study, 81 PEDIATRICS 537,537-39 (1988); see also Lynn W. 
Herzog & Susana R. Alvarez, The Frequency of Foreskin Problems in 
Uncircumcised Children, 140 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 254, 254-55 {1986); Van 
Howe, supra note 144, at 777-78. 
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boys. 147 
2. Urinary tract infections do not justify routine circumcision 
Of the claimed benefits of circumcision, only one - reduction of UTI -
would occur during childhood, before a male is able to decide for himself 
whether to undergo the procedure. Some studies have suggested a weak 
association between having a foreskin and developing a UTI148 a large 
proportion of UTis are the result of anatomical defects of the urinary 
tract and kidney. 149 The connection, however, is extremely tenuous; one 
study calculates that roughly 195 boys would require circumcision to 
prevent one UTI occurrence.150 Even a study by a leading circumcision 
advocate estimated that circumcision prevents UTI in less than one 
151 percent of boys who undergo the procedure. Unfortunately, no one has 
yet made a viable attempt at producing data demonstrably free of 
influence from the numerous potential confounding variables. Until a 
study takes into account the influence of rooming in, 152 breast feeding, 153 
147. See Van Howe, supra note 144, at 778. 
148. Teresa To et a!., Cohort Study on Circumcision of Newborn Boys and 
Subsequent Risk of Urinary-Tract Infection, 352 LANCET 1813, 1813, 1815 (1998); 
J.C. Craig, J.F. Knight, P. Sureshkumar, E. Mantz, L.P. Roy, Effect of 
Circumcision on Incidence of Urinary Tract Infection in Preschool Boys, 128 J. 
PEDIATRICS 23, 23-27 (1996); Ellen F. Crain, J.C. Gershel, Urinary Tract Infections 
in Febrile Infants Younger than 8 weeks of age, 86 PEDIATRICS 363, 363-67 (1990). 
149. Jan Winberg eta!., Epidemiology of Symptomatic Urinary Tract Infection 
in Childhood, 252 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA SUPPL. 1, 8 (1974); T. 
Bergstrom, Sex Differences in Childhood Urinary Tract Infection, 47 ARCHIVES OF 
DISEASE IN CHILDREN 227 (1972); S.R. Saxena, D.C. Bassett, Sex-related Incidence 
in Proteus Infection of the Urinary Tract in Childhood, 50 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE 
IN CHILDREN 899 (1975); R.J. Hallett et a!., Urinary Infection in Boys: A Three-
year Prospective Study, 2 LANCET 1107 (1976); Linda Pead & Rosalind Maskell, 
Study of Urinary Tract Infection in Children in One Health Disctrict, 309 BRITISH 
MEDICAL JOURNAL 631, 632 (1994); T. Bergstrom et a!., Symptomatic Urinary 
Tract Infection in Boys in the First Year of Life with Special Reference to Scar 
Formation, 1 INFECTION 192 (1973). 
150. See To eta!., supra note 148, at 1813, 1815 (1998). 
151. See Thomas E. Wiswell et a!., Declining Frequency of Circumcision: 
Implications for Changes in the Absolute Incidence and Male to Female Sex Ratio 
of Urinary Tract Infections in Early Infancy, 79 PEDIATRICS 338, 341 (1987). 
152. See Jan Winberg et a!., The Prepuce: A Mistake of Nature?, 1 LANCET 
598, 599 (1989). 
153. Alfredo Pisacane et a!., Breastfeeding and Urinary Tract Infection, 336 
LANCET 50, 50 (1990); Alfredo Pisacane et a!., Breast-Feeding and Urinary Tract 
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• 154 155 • 156 level of parental education, prenatal maternal UTI, premature btrth, 
history of UTI in a first degree relative,157 hygienic practices/58 previous 
bacterial or viral infection,159 previous course of antibiotics,160 race,161 urine 
collection method162 and diagnostic criteria/53 no definitive conclusions are 
Infection, 120 J. PEDIATRICS 87, 87, 89 (1992); Giovanni V. Coppa et al., 
Preliminary Study of Breastfeeding and Bacterial Adhesion to Uroepthelial Cells, 
335 LANCET 569, 570 (1990); Staffan MArild et al., Breastfeeding and Urinary- Tract 
Infection 336 LANCET 942, 942 (1990); Staffan MArild et al., Medical Histories of 
Children with Acute Pyelonephritis Compared with Controls, 8 PEDIATRIC 
INFECfiOUS DISEASE J. 511, 515 (1989). 
154. See D.C.L. Savage et al., Covert Bacteriuria of Childhood. A Clinical and 
Epidemiological Study, 48 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 8, 14 (1973). 
155. See generally Marguerite J. Patrick, Influence of Maternal Renal Infection 
on the Fetus and Infant, 42 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 208 (1967). 
156. See generally Mustapha Maherzi et al., Urinary Tract Infection in High-
Risk Newborn Infants, 62 PEDIATRICS 521 (1978); Abdulkareem I. Airede, 
Urinary-Tract Infections in African Neonates, 25 J. INFECfiON 55 (1992); A. 
Eliakim et al., Urinary Tract Infection in Premature Infants: the Role of Imaging 
Studies and Prophylactic Therapy, 17 J. PERINATOLOGY 305 (1997); Chester M. 
Edelmann Jr. et al., The Prevalence of Bacteriuria in Full-Term and Premature 
Newborn Infants, 82 J. PEDIATRICS 125 (1973). 
157. See MArild, Medical Histories, supra note 153, at 511-15. 
158. See Peter Malleson, Prepuce Care, 77 PEDIATRICS 265, 265 (1986); see 
also Kenneth L. Harkavy, The Circumcision Debate, 79 PEDIATRICS 649, 649 
(1987); Stan J. Watson, Care of the Uncircumcised Penis, 80 PEDIATRICS 765, 765 
(1987); Nicholas Cunningham, Circumcision and Urinary Tract Infections, 77 
PEDIATRICS 267,267 (1986). 
159. See Marild, Medical Histories, supra note 153, at 511-15. 
160. See id. 
161. See Asghar Askari & A.Barry Belman, Vesicoureteral Reflux in Black 
Girls, 127 J. UROLOGY 747 (1982); see also Steven J. Skoog & A. Barry Belman, 
Primary Vesicoureteral Reflux in the Black Child, 87 PEDIATRICS 538 (1991); 
Kathy N. Shaw et et a!., Prevalence of Urinary Tract Infection in Febrile Young 
Children in the Emergency Department (Abstract E16], 102 no.2 PEDIATRICS 390 
(1998), also available at http://www. pediatrics.org/cgi/con tent/full/102/2/e16 (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2000); Calvin M. Kunin, The Natural History of Recurrent 
Bacteriuria in Schoolgirls, 282 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1443, 1444 (1970); Calvin M. 
Kunin, Epidemiology and Natural History of Urinary Tract Infection in School 
Age Children, 18 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 509 (1971). 
162. See generally Theresa A. Schlager et a!., Explanation for False Positive 
Urine Cultures Obtained by Bag Technique, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 170 (1995); P.M. Fleiss, Explanation for False Positive Urine 
Cultures Obtained by Bag Technique, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT 
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possible regarding the protective effects of neonatal circumcision. This 
list of other possible variables suggests that even if circumcision did have 
an effect on UTI, a comparable or greater prophylactic effect could be 
accomplished by less drastic and less intrusive means - for example, by 
simply teaching parents and children proper hygiene and by encouraging 
mothers to breastfeed. 
Moreover, most UTis are minor and are easily treated with oral 
antibiotics. The foreskin has not been linked to the more serious 
MED. 1041 (1995); W.L. Robson & A.K. Leung, Explanation for False Positive 
Urine Cultures Obtained by Bag Technique, 149 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & 
ADOLESCENT MED. 1042 (1995); Jacob Amir et al., The Reliability of Midstream 
Urine Culture from Circumcised Male Infants, 147 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 969 
(1993); Theresa A. Schlager et al., Bacterial Contamination Rate of Urine Collected 
in a Urine Bag from Healthy Non-Toilet-Trained Male Infants, 116 J. PEDIATRICS 
738 (1990); Xavier Saez-Liorens et al., Bacterial Contamination Rates for Non-
Clean-Catch and Clean-Catch Midstream Urine Collections in Uncircumcised Boys, 
114 J. PEDIATRICS 93 (1989); Jacob A. Lohr et al., Bacterial Contamination Rates 
for Non-Clean-Catch and Clean-Catch Midstream Urine Collections in Boys, 109 J. 
PEDIATRICS 659 (1986); W.A. Bonadio, Urine Culturing Technique in Febrile 
Children, 3 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE 75 (1987); J.D. Nelson & P.C. Peters, 
Suprapubic Aspiration of Urine in Premature and Term Infants, 36 PEDIATRICS 
132 (1965); G.D. Abbott, Neonatal Bacteriuria- The Value of Bladder Puncture in 
Resolving Problems of Interpretation Arising from Voided Urine Specimens, 14 
AUSTL. PEDIATRIC J. 83 (1978); John M. McCarthy & Charles V. Pryles, Clean 
Voided and Catheter Neonatal Urine Specimens. Bacteriology in the Male and 
Female Neonate, 106 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 473 (1963); John J. Boehm & James 
L. Haynes, Bacteriology of 'Midstream Catch' Urines: Studies in Newborn Infants, 
111 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 366 (1966); C.G.H. Newman et al., Pyuria in Infancy, 
and the Role of Suprapubic Aspiration of Urine in the Diagnosis of Infections of 
the Urinary Tract, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 277 (1967); Ofelia T. Monzon et al. , A 
Comparison of Bacterial Counts of the Urine Obtained by Needle Aspiration of the 
Bladder, Catheterization and Midstream-Voided Methods, 259 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
764 (1958); Paul Valenstein & Frederick Meier, Urine Culture Contamination: A 
College of Am. Pathologists Q-probes Study of Contaminated Urine Cultures in 
906 Institutions, 122 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 123 (1998); J. 
Pylkkanen et al., Diagnostic Value of Symptoms and Clean-Voided Urine 
Specimens in Childhood Urinary Tract Infection, 68 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 341 (1979). 
163. See Alejandro Hoberman & Ellen R. Wald, Urinary Tract Infections in 
Young Febrile Children, 16 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 11 (1997); see also 
S. Hansson et al., Low Bacterial Counts in Infants with Urinary Tract Infection, 132 
J. PEDIATRICS 180 (1998). 
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infections that reach the kidneys.164 The most common infection-related 
claim by defenders of circumcision is that males not circumcised will 
develop renal failure. 165 However, that claim is unsupportable.166 There is 
no reliable data on the rate of renal failure in children in the United 
States.167 Two Swedish studies have yielded more reliable information.168 
The first study showed that UTI was not responsible for any of the renal 
failures among children in Sweden.169 The second study showed that UTI 
was responsible for only five percent of renal failures among children.170 
Using the highest recorded Swedish national rate of renal failure in 
164. See Elizabeth R. Mueller et al., The Incidence of Genitourinary 
Abnormalities in Circumcised and Uncircumcised Boys Presenting with an Initial 
Urinary Tract Infection by 6 Months of Age [Abstract 121], 100 PEDIATRICS 580, 
580 (1997). 
165. James A. Roberts, Neonatal Circumcision: An End to the Controversy? 
89 SOUTHERN MED. J. 167 (1996); James A. Roberts, Is Routine Circumcision 
Indicated in the Newborn? An Affirmative View, 31 J. FAM. PRAC. 185, 186-88 
(1990); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision Circumspection, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1244, 1244-45 (1997); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision-An Update, 22 CuRRENT 
PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS 424, 424-25 (1992); Thomas E. Wiswell, Routine 
Neonatal Circumcision: A Reappraisal, 41 AMERICAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN 859, 860 
(1990); Thomas E. Wiswell, Do You Favor . .. Routine Neonatal Circumcision? 
Yes, 84 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 98, 98 (1988); Edgar J. Schoen, The Status of 
Circumcision of Newborns, 322 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1308, 1309 (1990); Edgar J. 
Schoen, Benefits of Newborn Circumcision: Is Europe Ignoring Medical Evidence? 
77 ARCHIVES OF DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD 258 (1997); Edgar J. Schoen et al., New 
Policy on Circumcision- Cause for Concern, 105 PEDIATRICS 620 (2000). 
166. See Roberts, supra note 165, at 168-70 (1996); Schoen, supra note 165, at 
258; Thomas E. Wiswell, Do You Favor ... Routine Neonatal Circumcision? Yes, 
84 POSTGRADUATE MED. 98, 98-99 (1988); Thomas E. Wiswell & Dietrich W. 
Geschke, Risks from Circumcision during the First Month of Life Compared with 
Those for Uncircumcised Boys, 83 PEDIATRICS 1011, 1011, 1013 (1989); Thomas E. 
Wiswell, Routine Neonatal Circumcision: A Reappraisal, 41 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 
859, 859-60 (1990); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision Circumspection, 336 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1244, 1244-45 (1997); Thomas E. Wiswell, Circumcision Questions 
[Letters to the Editor- Reply], 93 PEDIATRICS 1021, 1022 (1994). 
167. Many of the European countries, through the records kept as part of 
their national health insurance, keep national registries of disease incidence. No 
such registries are maintained in the United States. 
168. See generally Ingemar Helin & Jan Winberg, Chronic Renal Failure in 
Swedish Children, 69 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 607 (1980); E. 
Esbjorner et al., Children with Chronic Renal Failure in Sweden 1978-1985, 4 
PEDIATRIC NEPHROLOGY 249 (1990). 
169. See Helin, supra note 168, at 610. 
170. See Esbjorner, supra note 168, at 249. 
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children and assuming that all cases of renal failure from UTI in boys 
could be prevented by neonatal circumcision, it would take 476,190 
circumcisions to prevent one instance of renal failure. Those 476,190 
circumcisions would, as a statistical matter, cause at least 952 life-
threatening complications.171 Circumcising to prevent renal failure is thus 
clearly irrational. 
In short, if circumcision does reduce UTI, it is a woefully ineffective 
method, especially when weighed against the very significant 
complications and other disadvantages which are discussed below in 
further detail. Contrary to the retrospective data gathered elsewhere, a 
prospective study of 603 Japanese boys, none of whom were circumcised, 
found that none had ever had a UTI.172 This result casts doubt upon the 
American studies from which one would have predicted that between six 
and twenty-four of these boys (1-4%) would have had a UTI. The 
Japanese study suggests that either Japanese hygiene is vastly superior or 
that the American studies are flawed. 
3. Penile cancer does not justify routine circumcision 
Accurate data on the rates of penile cancer in circumcised and intact 
men in the United States is not available. There have been no 
epidemiologic studies of the rate of penile cancer in circumcised males, 
nor has there been any studies that distinguished on the basis of 
circumcision status. Claims that routine circumcision has lowered penile 
cancer rates are therefore difficult to support. Countries such as Japan,173 
N 174 p· 1 d175 d D k 176 • h" h . . . . h orway, m an an enmar , m w 1c cucumcts1on IS rare, ave 
171. See William F. Gee & Julian S. Ansell, Neonatal Circumcision: A Ten-
year Overview: With Comparison of the Gomco Clamp and the Plastibell Device, 
58 PEDIATRICS 824; 827 (1976). 
172. See Hiroyuki Kayaba et a!., Analysis of Shape and Retractibility of the 
Prepuce in 603 Japanese Boys, 156 J. UROLOGY 1813 (1996). 
173. See C.S. Muir & Janine Nectoux, Epidemiology of Cancer of the Testis 
and Penis, National Cancer Institute Monograph 53: Second Symposium on 
Epidemiology and Cancer Registries in the Pacific Basin 157-64 (1979). 
174. See T. Iverson et al., Squamous Cell Carcinoma of the Penis and of the 
Cervix, Vulva and Vagina in Spouses: Is There Any Relationship? An 
Epidemiological Study from Norway, 1960-92, 76 BRIT. J. CANCER 658, 658 (1997). 
175. See A.G. Maiche, Epidemiological Aspects of Cancer of the Penis in 
Finland, 1 EuR. J. CANCER PREVENTION 153 (1992). 
176. See M. Frisch et al., Falling Incidence of Penis Cancer in an 
Uncircumcised Population (Denmark I943-90), 311 BRIT. MED. J. 1471 (1995). 
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penile cancer rates that are lower than the estimated rates in the United 
States.177 In any event, the rate of penile cancer in all western countries is 
extremely low; among all males in Japan, Finland, Norway, and Denmark, 
countries that employ national cancer registries, for example, the rate 
ranges from 0.5 to 0.8 per 100,000. In the United States, where the cancer 
incidences are based on estimates, the incidence of penile cancer is 
approximately 0.8 per 100,000 and accounts for only 0.16% of all cancers 
in American males.178 
By way of comparison, the combined rate of ovarian and breast cancer 
in women is 264 times higher than the rate of penile cancer in men, and 
b . h . h '1 179 A reast cancer ts muc more common m men t an pem e cancer. s 
noted above, clear, incontrovertible evidence demonstrates that 
prophylactic removal of breast and/or ovarian tissue would reduce the 
likelihood of developing cancer enough to add months to the life 
expectancy of average patients and several years to the life expectancy of 
women with genetic markers for breast cancer.180 Yet, as also noted 
above, the substantial potential benefit of an oophorectomy and/or 
mastectomy is universally regarded as inadequate to justify such 
prophylactic surgery, except in a woman at high-risk for ovarian or breast 
cancer.
181 It would be unthinkable to perform the surgery on a young girl. 
If a female were ever to undergo such prophylactic surgery it could not 
occur until after she both reached adulthood and gave informed consent 
to the procedure. Even if it were correct that circumcision reduces the 
risk of penile cancer to a statistically significant degree, it would still be 
clearly unjustified to use circumcision as a prophylactic. Even if the 
highest estimates of reduced risk were accurate, it would take over 
260,000 circumcisions to prevent a single case of penile cancer. It follows 
that in 260,000 circumcisions, one would expect 520 life-threatening 
complications.182 Routinely amputating healthy tissue in quest of such 
remote and speculative benefits is irrational and violates both medical 
h. d h . h 183 et tcs an uman ng ts. 
177. See P.A. Wingo et al., Cancer Statistics, 1995, 45 CAL. CANCER J. FOR 
CLINICIANS 8-30 (1995). 
178. See id. 
179. See S.L. Parker et al., Cancer Statistics, 1997, 47 CAL. CANCER J. FOR 
CLINICIANS 5-27 (1997). 
180. See further discussion supra Part II. C. 
181. See further discussion supra Part II. C. 
182. See Gee, supra note 171, at 824-27. 
183. See Svoboda, supra note 3, at 205-15 (routine infant male circumcision 
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4. Sexually transmitted disease prevention does not justify 
routine circumcision 
The role of circumcision in preventing STDs is even less clear. For 
each sexually transmitted infection, including HIV, there are 
contradictory medical studies.184 Because the epidemiology of STDs 
involves a mixture of biological, sociological and psychological factors, it 
is impossible to isolate the foreskin as a factor in the spread of STDs. The 
available medical literature suggests certain trends, but nothing definitive. 
Circumcised men actually appear more likely to contract urethritis (such 
as gonorrhea or chlamydia) or viral infections (such as herpes simplex or 
human papillomavirus). Intact men, on the other hand, appear slightly 
more prone to genital ulcers (such as chancroid).185 The role of 
circumcision in the transmission of HIV is far from decided.186 
Although several African studies have suggested that circumcision 
reduces the risk of HIV infection, several others have failed to document 
any significant influence.187 A few population surveys have found 
circumcision to increase the risk of HIV infection.188 Meta-analysis of the 
published studies has revealed a significant degree of between-study 
heterogeneity. The one trend noted is that a foreskin may place an 
African man who engages in high-risk sexual behaviors at increased risk 
for HIV infection.189 For the general population, circumcision does not 
violates numerous human rights under a variety of international treaties including 
the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child); Denniston, supra note 61. 
184. R.S. Van Howe, Does Circumcision Influence Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases?: A Literature Review, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 52, 52-62 (1999). 
185. See id. 
186. See I. De Vincenzi & T. Mertens, Male Circumcision: A Role in HIV 
Prevention?, 8 AIDS 153 (1994); R.S. Van Howe, Circumcision and HIV Infection: 
Meta-analysis and Review of the Medical Literature, 10 INT'L J. STD & AIDS 8 
(1999). 
187. See Van Howe, supra note 186, at 8-16. 
188. See id. 
189. See Nigel O'Farrell & Matthias Egger, Circumcision in Men and the 
Prevention of HIV Infection: A "Meta-Analysis" Revisited, 11 INT'L J. STD & 
AIDS 137, 141 (2000); R. Hayes & H.A. Weiss, Meta-Analysis on the 
Relationships between Male Circumcision and HW Infection (paper presented at 
the Thirteenth Meeting of the International Society for Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases Research, Denver, Colorado, July 13, 1999). 
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appear to have an impact.190 Even proponents of circumc1s1on 
acknowledge that the African experience with HIV does not apply to first 
world countries. 191 The most effective timing of circumcision is also under 
dispute. One African study documented that males circumcised before 
fifteen years of age were at greater risk of contracting HIV,192 while those 
circumcised after twelve years of age were at a lower risk. 193 Because 
genital discharge is more prevalent than genital ulcers, the one consistent 
trend, from several recent population surveys, is that circumcised men are 
at greater risk for contracting a STD.194 It is therefore inappropriate to 
cite avoidance of STDs as a justification for circumcision. 
B. Harm caused by male circumcision 
1. Complications 
On the cost side, retrospective studies show that rates of immediate 
complications associated with neonatal circumcision are somewhere 
between 2.0%195 and 6.8%.196 One prospective study, looking only for 
evidence of hemorrhage, found the rate of hemorrhage following neonatal 
circumcision was 9.9%.197 These estimates all exceed the 1.0% to 1.7% 
190. See O'Farrell & Egger, supra note 189, at 141; Hayes & Weiss, supra 
note 189. 
191. See Stephen Moses et al., Analysis of the Scientific Literature on Male 
Circumcision and Risk for HIV Infection, 10 INT'L J. STD & AIDS 626 (1999). 
192. See Maria Quigley et al., Sexual Behaviour Patterns and Other Risk 
Factors for HIV Infection in Rural Tanzania: A Case-Control Study, 11 AIDS 237 
(1997). 
193. See Robert Kelly et al., Age of Male Circumcision and Risk of Prevalent 
HIV Infection in Rural Uganda, 13 AIDS 399, 399 (1999). 
194. See Jeff Seed et al., Male Circumcision, Sexually Transmitted Disease, 
and Risk of HJV, 8 J. OF ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME & HUMAN 
RETROVIROLOGY 83 (1995); see also Edward 0 . Laumann et al., Circumcision in 
the United States: Prevalence, Prophylactic Effects, and Sexual Practice, 277 JAMA 
1052 (1997); Mark Urassa et al., Male Circumcision and Susceptibility to HIV 
Infection among Men in Tanzania, 11 AIDS 73 (1997); Van'Howe, supra note 144, 
at 52-62. 
195. See Gee, supra note 171, at 827. 
196. See Carlos A. Moreno & Janet P. Realini, Infant Circumcision in an 
Outpatient Setting, 85 TEX. MED. 37,37 (1989). 
197. See James M. Sutherland et al., Hemorrhagic Disease of the Newborn: 
Breast Feeding as a Necessary Factor in the Pathogenesis, 113 AM. J. DISEASES IN 
CHILD. 524 (1967). 
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rate of complications for circumcisions performed after the first month of 
life. 198 Complications range from hemorrhage-sometimes to the point of 
death and frequently necessitating a transfusion;199 minor infections;200 life-
threatening infections such as sepsis,201 meningitis,202 gangrene,203 
198. See Thomas E. Wiswell et al., Circumcision in Children Beyond the 
Neonatal Period, 92 PEDIATRICS 791, 791 (1993); see also S. Walfisch et al., 
Circumcision of New Immigrants, 126 HAREFUAH 119 (1994); Venkata R. Jayanthi 
et a!., Postneonatal Circumcision with Local Anesthesia: A Cost-Effective 
Alternative, 161 J. UROLOGY 1301, 1301 (1999). 
199. See Abdall S. Awidi, Delivery of Infants with Glanzmann 
Thrombasthenia and Subsequent Blood Transfusion Requirements: A Follow-up of 
39 Patients, 40 AM. J. HEMATOLOGY 1, 1 (1992); see generally G. Steinau et a!., 
Tageschirurgische (TCH) Eingriffe Im Kindesalter an Einer Chirurgischen Klinik, 
118 ZENTRALBLATT FOR CHIRURGIE 25 (1993); R.W. Watts and P.A. Stokes, 
Secondary Arterial Haemorrhage following Circumcision; An Unusual Cause of 
Antepartum Haemorrhage, 26 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 312 
(1986); John Denton et al., Circumcision Complication: Reaction to Treatment of 
Local Hemorrhage with Topical Epinephrine in High Concentration, 17 CLINICAL 
PEDIATRICS 285, 285 (1978); J.S. Poll & J.E. Prinsen, Niet-geplande opname na 
dagverpleging bij kinderen, 134 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR GENEESKUNDE 
1089 (1990); Wolfgang Cyran, Aus der Praxis einer Gutachterstelle: Schwere 
Nachblutung nach einer Phimosenoperation, 88 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ARZTLICHE 
FORTBILDUNG 703 (1994); Gee, supra note 171, at 824-27; T.M. Tsang & P.K. 
Tam, Complications of Circumcision, 81 BRIT. J. SURGERY 473, 473 (1994); 
Willson, Cesarean Section for Threatened Eclampsia and Death of the Child 
following Circumcision, 68 AM. J. OBSTETRICS 351 (1913). 
200. See J. Stranko et a!., Impetigo in Newborn Infants Associated with a 
Plastic Bell Clamp Circumcision, 5 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE 597, 597-98 
(1986); see also A.B. Zafar, R.C. Butler, D.J. Reese, L.A. Gaydos and P.A. 
Mennonna, Use of 0.3% Triclosan (Bacti Stat) to Eradicate an Outbreak of 
Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus in a Neonatal Nursery, 23 AM. J. 
INFECTION CONTROL 200, 200 (1995); John D. Nelson et a!., A Prolonged Nursery 
Epidemic Associated with a Newly Recognized Type of Group A Streptococcus, 89 
J. PEDIATRICS 792, 792 (1976); Thomas E. Wiswell et al., Staphylococcus Aureus 
Colonization after Neonatal Circumcision in Relation to Device Used, 119 J. 
PEDIATRICS 302, 302 (1991). 
201. See Barry V. Kirkpatrick & Donald V. Eitzman, Neonatal Septicemia 
after Circumcision, 13 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 767, 767 (1974); see also David 
Braun, Neonatal Bacteremia and Circumcision, 85 PEDIATRICS 135, 135 (1990); R. 
Southby & N. Myers, A Case Against Circumcision, 2 MED. J. AUSTL. 393, 393 
(1965); T.G. Cleary & S. Kohl, Overwhelming Infection with Group B Beta-
Hemolytic Streptococcus Associated with Circumcision, 64 PEDIATRICS 301, 301 
(1979). 
202. See Samuel Menahem, Complications Arising from Ritual Circumcision: 
2000] Neonatal Circumcision 105 
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Pathogenesis and Possible Prevention, 17 lsR. J. MED. SCI. 45, 45 (1981); see also 
J.M. Scurlock & P.J. Pemberton, Neonatal Meningitis and Circumcision, 1 MED. J. 
AUSTL. 332 (1977). 
203. See D.F. Du Toit and W.T. Villet, Gangrene of the Penis after 
Circumcision: A Report of 3 Cases, 55 S. AFR. MED. J. 521, 521 (1979); see also 
Sidney J. Sussman et a!., Fournier's Syndrome. Report of Three Cases and Review 
of the Literature, 132 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 11S9, 1189 (197$); I. Evbuomwan 
& A.S. Aliu, Acute Gangrene of the Scrotum in a One Month Old Child, 36 
TROPICAL & GEOGRAPHICAL MED. 299, 299 (1984); Adetunji A. Adeyokunnu, 
Fournier's Syndrome in Infants. A Review of Cases from Ibadan, Nigeria, 22 
CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 101, 101 (1983); William G. Hamm & Frank F. Kanthak, 
Gangrene of the Penis following Circumcision with High Frequency Current, 42 S. 
MED. J. 657, 657 (1949); P. Thorek and P. Egel, Reconstruction of the Penis with 
Split-Thickness Skin Graft: A Case of Gangrene following Circumcision for Acute 
Balanitis, 4 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 469 (1949); S. Ahmed et a!., 
Penile Reconstruction following Post-Circumc,ision Penile Gangrene, 9 PEDIATRIC 
SURGERY INT'L 295, 295 (1994); S. Kurel, Iatrogenic Penile Gangrene: 10-Year 
Follow-Up, 95 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 210, 210 (1995); Edward 
W. Pinkham Jr & Andrew W. Stevenson Jr., Unusual Reaction to Local 
Anesthesia: Gangrene of the Prepuce, 9 U.S. ARMED FORCES MED. J. 120, 120 
(1958); David P. Bliss eta!., Necrotizing Fasciitis after Plastibell Circumcision, 131 
J. PEDIATRICS 459,459 (1997). 
204. See Endla K. Anday & Joyce Kobori, Staphylococcal Scalded Skin 
Syndrome: A Complication of Circumcision, 21 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 420, 420 
(1982); David Annunziato & Louis M. Goldblum, Staphylococcal Scalded Skin 
Syndrome. A Complication of Circumcision, 132 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 1187, 
1187 (1978). 
205. See Binita R. Shah eta!., Clinical Picture, 4 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 670, 
671 (1995). 
206. See K. Uwyyed et a!., Scrotal Abscess with Bacteremia Caused by 
Salmonella Group Dafter Ritual Circumcision, 9 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
J. 65, 65 (1990); see also Gabriel Dinari eta!., Umbilical Arteritis and Phlebitis with 
Scrotal Abscess and Peritonitis, 6 J. PEDIATRICS SURGERY 176, 176 (1971). 
207. See J.C. Craig et al., Acute Obstructive Uropathy-A Rare Complication 
of Circumcision, 153 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 369 (1994); see generally J.D. Eason et 
a!.,_Male Ritual Circumcision Resulting in Acute Renal Failure, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 
660 (1994); M.G. Ochsner, Acute Urinary Retention: Causes and Treatment , 71 
POSTGRADUATE MED. 221 (1982); W. Berman, Letter: Urinary Retention Due to 
Ritual Circumcision, 56 PEDIATRICS 621 (1975); M. Frand et a!. , Complication of 
Ritual Circumcision in Israel, 54 PEDIATRICS 521 (1974). 
208. See D.J. Smith et a!., An Uncommon Complication of Circumcision, 73 
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amputation;211 iatrogenic hypospadias;212 total denudation of the penis;213 
BRIT. J. UROLOGY 459 (1994). 
209. See H. Stefan, Reconstruction of the Penis after Necrosis Due to 
Circumcision Burn, 4 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS SURGERY 40 (1994); see also J.B. 
Rosefsky Jr, Glans Necrosis as a Complication of Circumcision, 39 PEDIATRICS 
774 (1967); J.R. Woodside, Necrotizing Fasciitis after Neonatal Circumcision, 134 
AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 301 (1980); N. Sterenberg eta!., Necrosis of the Glans 
Penis following Neonatal Circumcision, 68 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 
237 (1981); J.R. Woodside, How to Lessen Risk of Wound Infection after 
Circumcision, 48 MODERN MED. 93 (1980). 
210. See P.S. Bergeson et a!., The Inconspicuous Penis, 92 PEDIATRICS 794 
(1993); see generally J.A. van-der Zee et a!., Een Ernstige Complicatie Ten 
Gevolge Van Rituele Circumcisie Van Een 'Begraven' Penis, 135 NEDERLANDS 
TIJDSCHRIFf VOOR GENEESKUNDE 1604 (1991); J. Radhakrishnan & H.M. Reyes, 
Penoplasty for Buried Penis Secondary to "Radical" Circumcision, 19 J. 
PEDIATRICS SURGERY 629 (1984); M. Kon, A Rare Complication following 
Circumcision: The Concealed Penis, 130 J. UROLOGY 573 (1983); R.D. Talarico 
and J.E. Jasaitis, Concealed Penis: A Complication of Neonatal Circumcision, 110 
J. UROLOGY 732 (1973); W.C. Trier & G.W. Drach, Concealed Penis. Another 
Complication of Circumcision, 125 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 276 (1973); G.J. 
Alter et a!., Buried Penis as a Contraindication for Circumcision, 178 J. AM. COLL. 
SURGERY 487 (1994); C.E. Horton et al., Hidden Penis Release: Adjunctive 
Suprapubic Lipectomy, 19 ANNALS PLASTIC SURGERY 131 (1987); P.K. Donahoe 
& M.A. Keating, Preputial Unfurling to Correct the Buried Penis, 21 J. PEDIATRICS 
SURG. 1055 (1986); D.H. Stewart, The Toad in the Hole Circumcision-a Surgical 
Bugbear, 191 BOSTON MED. & SURGERY J. 1216 (1924); S.R. Shapiro, Surgical 
Treatment of the 'Buried' Penis, 30 UROLOGY 554 (1987); M. Maizels et al., 
Surgical Correction of the Buried Penis: Description of a Classification System and 
a Technique to Correct the Disorder, 136 J. UROLOGY 268 (1986). 
211. See B.S. Strimling, Partial Amputation of Glans Penis during Mogen 
Clamp Circumcision, 97 PEDIATRICS 906 (1996); see generally J. Sherman et al. , 
Circumcision: Successful Glanular Reconstruction and Survival following 
Amputation, 156 J. UROLOGY 842 (1996); A.F. Yilmaz et at., Rare Complication of 
Circumcision: Penile Amputation and Reattachment, 23 EuR. UROLOGY 423 
(1993); D.A. Gilbert et al., Phallic Construction in Prepubertal and Adolescent 
Boys, 149 J. UROLOGY 1521-26 (1993); Menahem, supra note 202, at 45-48; S.B. 
Levitt et a!., Iatrogenic Microphallus Secondary to Circumcision, 8 UROLOGY 472-
74 (1976); G. Audry et al., Amputation of Penis after Circumcision-Penoplasty 
Using Expandable Prosthesis, 4 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS SURGERY 44 (1994); J .P. 
Gearhart & J.A. Rock, Total Ablation of the Penis after Circumcision with 
Electrocautery: A Method of Management and Long-Term Followup, 142 J. 
UROLOGY 799-801 (1989); A. Azmy et al., Successful Reconstruction following 
Circumcision with Diathermy, 57 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 587 (1985); K.A. Hanash, 
Plastic Reconstruction of Partially Amputated Penis At Circumcision, 18 UROLOGY 
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291 (1981); A.Y. Izzidien, Successful Replantation of a Traumatically Amputated 
Penis in a Neonate, 16 J. PEDIATRICS SURGERY 202 (1981); J . Money, Ablatio 
Penis: Normal Male Infant Sex-Reassigned as a Girl, 4 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR 65-71 (1975); G.R. Gluckman et al., Newborn Penile Glans Amputation 
during Circumcision and Successful Reattachment, 153 J. UROLOGY 778 (1995); 
J.B. Brimhall, Amputation of the Penis following a Unique Method of Preventing 
Hemorrhage after Circumcision, 4 ST. PAUL MED. J. 490 (1902); E. Neulander et 
al., Amputation of Distal Penile Glans During Neonatal Ritual Circumcision-A 
Rare Complication, 77 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 924 (1996); A. Hanukoglu et al., Serious 
Complications of Routine Ritual Circumcision in a Neonate: Hydro-
ureteronephrosis, Amputation of Glans Penis, and Hyponatraemia, 154 EuR. J. 
PEDIATRICS 314 (1995); B.L. Lerner, Amputation of the Penis as a Complication of 
Circumcision, 46 MED. RECORDS & ANNALS 229 (1952). 
212. See generally M. Cetinkaya et al., Two Serious Complications of 
Circumcision. Case Report, 27 SCANDINAVIAN J. UROLOGY & NEPHROLOGY 121 
(1993). 
213. See J. Orozco-Sanchez & R. Neri-Vela, Denudacion total del pene por 
circuncision. Descripcion de una tecnica de plastia del pene para su correccion, 48 
BOL. MED. HOSP. INFANT MEX. 565, 565-69 (1991); see generally J.R. Sotolongo Jr. 
et al., Penile Denudation Injuries after Circumcision, 133 J. UROLOGY 102 (1985); 
P. Smey, re: Penile Denudation Injuries after Circumcision, 134 J. UROLOGY 1220 
(1985); C.L. Wilson & M.C. Wilson, Plastic Repair of the Denuded Penis, 52 S. 
MED. J. 288-90 (1959); J. VanDuyn & W.S. Warr, Excessive Penile Skin Loss from 
Circumcision, 51 J. MED. Ass'N GA. 394 (1962); J.B. Brown, Restoration of the 
Entire Skin of the Penis, 65 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 362 (1937); 
J.B. Brown & M.P. Fryer, Surgical Reconstruction of the Penis, 17 G. P. 104, 104-
07 (1958); W.W. Ezell et al., Mechanical Traumatic Injury to the Genitalia in 
Children, 102 J. UROLOGY 788-92 (1969). 
214. See J. Horwitz et al., Abdominal Distension following Ritual 
Circumcision, 57 PEDIATRICS 579 (1976). 
215. See M.R. Auerbach & J.W. Scanlon, Recurrence of Pneumothorax as a 
Possible Complication of Elective Circumcision, 132 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 583 (1978). 
216. See E.R. Owen & J.L. Kitson, Plastibell Circumcision, 44 BRIT. J. 
CLINICAL PRAC. 661 (1990); see also N.S. Datta & N.R. Zinner, Complication from 
Plastibell Circumcision Ring, 9 UROLOGY 57 (1977); R.E. Johnsonbaugh, 
Complication of a Circumcision Performed with a Plastic Disposable Circumision 
Device: Long-Term Follow-Up, 133 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 438 (1979); T. 
Malo & R.J. Bonforte, Hazards of Plastic Bell Circumcisions, 33 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 869 (1969); G. Jonas, Retention of a Plastibell Circumcision Ring: 
Report of a Case, 24 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 835 (1984); M.M. Rubenstein & 
W.M. Bason, Complication of Circumcision Done with a Plastic Bell Clamp, 116 
AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 381 (1968). 
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217. See generally J.T. Lackey et al., Subglanular Urethral Fistula from Infant 
Circumcision, 62 J. IND. STATE MED. ASS'N 1305 (1969); J.T. Lackey et al., 
Urethral Fistula Following Circumcision, 206 JAMA 2318 (1968); R.D. Limaye & 
R.A. Hancock, Penile Urethral Fistula as a Complication of Circumcision, 72 J. 
PEDIATRICS 105 (1968); A. Benchekroun et al., Fistules urethrales apres 
circoncision: a propos de 15 cas, 3 MAROC MED. 715-18 (1981); J.T. Lau & G.B. 
Ong, Subglandular Urethral Fistula following Circumcision: Repair by the 
Advancement Method, 126 J. UROLOGY 702 (1981); I.W. Shiraki, Congenital 
Megalourethra with Urethrocutaneous Fistula following Circumcision: A Case 
Report, 109 J. UROLOGY 723 (1973); S.Y. Tennenbaum & L.S. Palmer, Congenital 
Urethrocutaneous Fistulas, 43 UROLOGY 98-99 (1994); A.H. Colodny, Congenital 
Urethrocutaneous Fistulas, 44 UROLOGY 149 (1994); S. Johnson, Persistent 
Urethral Fistula following Circumcision: Report of a Case, 49 U.S. NAVAL MED. 
BULL. 120-22 (1949). 
218. See A.R. MacKenzie, Meatal Ulceration following Neonatal 
Circumcision, 28 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 221 (1966); see also H.F. Meyer, 
Meatal Ulcer in the Circumcised Infant, 99 MED. TIMES 77 (1971). 
219. See generally L.D. Jee & A.J. Millar, Ruptured Bladder following 
Circumcision Using the Plastibell Device, 65 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 216 (1990). 
220. See generally K.P. Connelly et al., Gastric Rupture Associated with 
Prolonged Crying in a Newborn Undergoing Circumcision, 31 CLINICAL 
PEDIATRICS 560 (1992). 
221. See generally A. Mor et al. , Tachycardia and Heart Failure after Ritual 
Circumcision, 62 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 80 (1987). 
222. See generally M.L. Ruff et al., Myocardial Injury following Immediate 
Postnatal Circumcision, 144 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 850 (1982). 
223. See generally C.K. Pearlman, Caution Advised on Electrocautery 
Circumcisions, 19 UROLOGY 453 (1982); C.K. Pearlman, Reconstruction following 
Iatrogenic Burn of the Penis, 11 J. PEDIATRICS SURGERY 121 (1976). 
224. See J.E. Curtis, Circumcision Complicated by Pulmonary Embolism, 132 
NURSING MIRROR MIDWIVES]. 28,28-30 (1971). 
225. See generally John F. Redman et al., Postcircumcision Phimosis and Its 
Management, 14 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 407 (1975); Kaweblum, supra note 144; 
Hawa Patel, The Problem of Routine Circumcision, 95 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 576 
(1966); C. Terry Russell & Janet Chaseling, Topical Anaesthesia in Neonatal 
Circumcision: A Study of208 Consecutive Cases, 25 AUSTL. FAM. PHYSICIAN S30-
S34, suppl. 1 (1996); Van Howe, supra note 144, at 776. 
226. See R. Arnon et al., Unilateral Leg Cyanosis: An Unusual Complication 
of Circumcision, 151 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 716,716 (1992). 
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2. Pain 
An additional and generally under-appreciated cost is trauma to the 
newborn. Research has determined that newborns experience more pain 
from a given noxious stimuli than do older children and adults.230 The 
227. See generally C.D. Berry Jr. & R.R. Cross Jr., Urethral Meatal Caliber in 
Circumcised and Uncircumcised Males, 92 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 621 (1956); A. 
Steg & G. Allouch, Stenose du Meat et Circoncision, 85 J. UROLOGY & 
NEPHROLOGY 727 (1979); J.D. Frank et a!., Urethral Strictures in Childhood, 62 
BRIT. J. UROLOGY 590 (1988); C. Viville & J. Weltzer, Les Retrecissements 
Iatrogenes De Lurethre (R.I.U.) Masculin. A Propos De 50. Observations, 87 J. 
UROLOGY 413 (1981); John Graves, Pinpoint Meatus: Iatrogenic? 41 PEDIATRICS 
1013 (1968); Meyer, supra note 176; D.M. Griffiths et al., A Prospective Survey of 
the Indications and Morbidity of Circumcision in Children, 11 EuR. UROLOGY 184 
(1985); M.C. Daley, Circumcision, 214 JAMA 2195 (1970); Douglas Gairdner, The 
Fate of the Foreskin: a Study of Circumcision, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1433-37 (1949); 
Patel, supra note 225, at 576; Alexandra Stenram et a!., Circumcision for Phimosis: 
A Follow-up Study, 20 SCANDINAVIAN J. UROLOGY & NEPHROLOGY 89-92 (1986); 
A. Stenram et a!., Circumcision for Phimosis-Indications and Results, 75 ACTA 
PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 321 (1986); R. Persad et al., Clinical Presentation 
and Pathophysiology of Meatal Stenosis following Circumcision, 75 BRIT. J. 
UROLOGY 91 (1995); A. Ralph Thompson, Stricture of the External Urinary 
Meatus, 1 LANCET 1373-77 (1935); J. Brennemann, The Ulcerated Meatus in· the 
Circumcised Child, 21 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILD. 38-47 (1921); Paul Freud, The 
Ulcerated Urethral Meatus in Male Children, 31 J. PEDIATRICS 131-42 (1947); 
W.M. Mastin, Infantile Circumcision a Cause of Contraction of the External 
Urethral Meatus, 4 ANNALS ANATOMY & SURGERY 123 (1881); Van Howe, supra 
note 144, at 776. 
228. See generally A.G. Toguri et a!., Penile Tourniquet Syndrome Caused by 
Hair, 72 S. MED. J. 627 (1979); F.S. Haddad, Penile Strangulation by Human Hair. 
Report of Three Cases and Review of the Literature, 37 UROLOGY INT'L 375-88 
(1982); Allan J. Pantuck et al., Hair Strangulation Injury of the Penis, 13 
PEDIATRIC EMER. CARE 423 (1997); M. Aboulola et a!., Plaies de l'uretre par 
cheveu etrangleur, 21 CHIRURGIE PEDIATRIQUE 283 (1980); A.Y. Bashir & M. £!-
Barbary, Hair Coil Strangulation of the Penis, 25 J. ROYAL COLL. SURGERY 47-51 
(1980). 
229. See generally Louis W. Sauer, Fatal Staphylococcus Bronchopneumonia 
following Ritual Circumcision, 46 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 583 (1943); 
Willson, supra note 199, at 351. 
230. See K.J.S. Anand & P.R. Hickey, Pain and Its Effects in the Human 
Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321, 1321-29 (1987). 
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procedure is extremely painful.231 During circumcision, forceps or other 
probes are inserted into the delicate foreskin, where they are used to 
scrape, tear apart and destroy the normal erogenous tissues. The baby's 
sensitive foreskin is crushed, and the raw flesh is cut with scissors. 
Circumcision is usually followed by an alteration in sleep pattern marked 
by prolonged non-rapid eye movement sleep.232 The procedure frequently 
causes the newborn to withdraw from his environment thus interfering 
with his process of bonding with the mother and nursing.233 General 
anesthesia is considered too risky for use in the neonatal period, so most 
neonatal circumcisions are performed without anesthesia.234 Topical and 
local anesthetics, which blunt some of the pain, do not adequately protect 
the infant. Experimental evidence indicates that newborns experience 
marked pain during circumcision, even when these agents are employed.235 
In 1997, researchers altered the number of subjects enrolled in an infant 
circumcision pain study because they concluded that inflicting pain on 
231. See P. Drake & L. French, Analgesia during Circumcision, 45 J. FAM. 
PRAC. 100 (1997); Janice Lander eta!., Comparison of Ring Block, Dorsal Penile 
Nerve Block, and Topical Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 278 JAMA 2157-62 (1997). 
232. See Robert N. Emde et a!., Stress and Neonatal Sleep, 33 
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 491, 491-97 (1971). 
233. See Richard E. Marshall et a!., Circumcision: II. Effects Upon Mother-
Infant Interaction, 7 EARLY HUMAN DEY. 367, 367-74 (1982). 
234. See Tom Garry, Circumcision: a Survey of Fees and Practices, OBG 
MANAGEMENT 34, 36 (Oct. 1994); see also Catherine Kelly et a!., Pediatric 
Residency Training in the Normal Newborn Nursery: A National Survey, 151 
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 511, 511-14 (1997). 
235. See Robert S. Van Howe, Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision: Who 
Benefits?, 12 J. PRENATAL & PERINATAL PSYCHOLOGY & HEALTH 3, 3-4, 6, 9-10, 
13 (1997); see also RobertS. Van Howe, Anaesthesia for Circumcision: A Review 
of the Literature, MALE AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC PRACTICE 67, 67, 80, 81-82, 88 (George 
C. Denniston, Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. Milos eds. 1999); Cynthia R. 
Howard et a!., Acetaminophen Analgesia in Neonatal Circumcision: The Effect on 
Pain, 93 PEDIATRICS 641, 641, 645 (1994); Howard J. Stang eta!., Local Anesthesia 
for Neonatal Circumcision. Effects on Distress and Cortisol Response, 259 JAMA 
1507, 1507, 1509-10, 1511 (1988); Teresa D. Puthoff eta!., Use of EMLA Prior to 
Circumcision, 30 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1327, 1328, 1329 (1996); Anna 
Taddio et a!., Efficacy and Safety of Lidocaine-prilocaine Cream for Pain during 
Circumcision, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1197, 1200-01 (1997); Paul S. 
Williamson & Nolan D. Evans, Neonatal Cortisol Response to Circumcision with 
Anesthesia, 25 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 412,412,414 (1986). 
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unanesthetized control patients was unethical.236 
Circumcision causes trauma to infants who are born with relatively few 
pain coping mechanisms.237 Pain causes irreversible changes in the infant's 
developing brain, heightening his pain perception.238 These facts strongly 
support at least delaying circumcision until a male is older, when more 
can be done to avoid pain because the brain is more developed, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of permanent damage from the trauma. A 
prominent pediatric urologist has opined that postponing circumcision 
until after toilet training may also decrease the high rate of meatal 
stenosis in circumcised boys.239 
3. Loss of Function 
One recent study found that in circumcision approximately 50% of the 
penile skin sheath is removed, along with thousands of specialized nerve 
endings that are fundamental to normal sexual response.240 The sheath 
provides a natural lubricant and facilitates vaginal penetration during 
sexual intercourse.241 As a portion of the male reproductive apparatus, 
236. See Lander, supra note 231, at 2157, 2159. 
237. SeeM. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Pain, MRC News 20-23 (Summer 1998). 
238. See Suzanne Dixon et al., Behavioral Effects of Circumcision with and 
without Anesthesia, 51. DEY. & BEHAVIORAL PEDIATRICS 246,249 (1984); see also 
Anna Taddio et al., Effect of Neonatal Circumcision on Pain Responses during 
Vaccination in Boys, 345 LANCET 291, 292 (1995); Anna Taddio et al., Effect of 
Neonatal Circumcision on Pain Response during Subsequent Routine Vaccination, 
349 LANCET 599, 599, 602 (1997). 
239. See J.D. Frank, Circumcision, Meatotomy and Meatoplasty, in PEDIATRIC 
SURGERY 738, 745 (L. Spitz & A.G. Coran eds. 5th ed. 1995). 
240. See Christopher J. Cold & Kenneth A. McGrath, Anatomy and Histology 
of the Penile and Clitoral Prepuce in Primates: Evolutionary Perspective of 
Specialised Sensory Tissue of the External Genitalia, in MALE AND FEMALE 
CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC 
PRACTICE 19, 19-20 (George C. Denniston, Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. 
Milos eds. 1999); see also Steve Scott, Anatomy and Physiology of the Human 
Prepuce, in MALE AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC PRACTICE 9, 15, 16 (George C. Denniston, 
Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. Milos eds. 1999); J.R. Taylor et al., The 
Prepuce: Specialized Mucosa of the Penis and Its Loss to Circumcision, 77 BRIT. J. 
UROLOGY 291, 291 (1996). 
241. See P.M. Fleiss, The Case Against Circumcision, MOTHERING <j[ 23 (Dec. 
22, 1997). 
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the foreskin is clearly not triviae42 
4. Loss of Immunological Protection and Physical Protection 
The human foreskin serves to protect the glans, an internal structure, 
from injury. The prepuce also serves valuable immunological functions 
by providing several defenses against infection.243 The infant's prepuce 
has a pronounced tight tip with a sphincter, formed from the whorl of 
muscle tissue that stays closed to keep out foreign ·matter but opens to 
permit the outflow of urine.244 The sub-preputial wetness contains several 
secretions that act to destroy harmful microorganisms.245 The prepuce 
contains Langerhans cells, which provide the first line of mucosal 
immunity.246 Our understanding of mucosal immunity is still in its 
. f 247 
m ancy. 
C. Medical Considerations Strongly Disfavor Routine Circumcision 
Appropriate decision-making regarding the permissibility of infant 
circumcision requires balancing a negligible reduction of overall UTI and 
penile cancer rates against the significant disadvantages of the 
procedure -loss of functional and highly erogenous tissue, loss of 
immunological properties of the foreskin, risks of complications and the 
excruciating pain the newborn experiences. This balancing surely would 
yield the conclusion that the procedure is medically contra-indicated and 
not in the best interests of the infant patient. 
Numerous medical bodies around the world have recognized that 
242. See Ronald S. Immerman·& Wade C. Mackey, A Biocultural Analysis of 
Circumcision, 44 Soc. BIOLOGY 265,265-67,273 (1997). 
243. See P.M. Fleiss et a!., Immunological Functions of the Human Prepuce, 
74 SEXUALLY TRANSMIITED INFECTIONS 364, 364 (1998); see generally Gregory L. 
Smith eta!., Circumcision as a Risk Factor for Urethritis·in Racial Groups, 77 AM. 
J. PuB. HEALTH 452, 452, 454 (1987); Paul M.N. Werker eta!., The Prepuce Free 
Flap: Dissection Feasibility Study and Clinical Application of a Super-Thin Flap, 
102 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1075 (1998) . 
244. See Geoffrey Jefferson, The Peripenis Muscle: Some Observations on the 
Anatomy of Phimosis, 23 SURGICAL GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 177, 178 
(August, 1916). 
245. See generally John Money & Jackie Davison, Adult Penile Circumcision: 
Its Erotosexual and Cosmetic Sequelae, 19 J. SEX RESEARCH 289 (1983). 
246. See C.J. Cold and J.R. Taylor, The Prepuce, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 34, 
40 (1999). 
247. See Fleiss, supra note 243, at 364. 
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routine infant circumcision is not medically justifiable. For example, in 
1996, the Australian Association of Pediatric Surgeons announced that it 
does not support routine infant circumcision, because it is "inappropriate 
and unnecessary."248 In 1997, the Australian Medical Association stated 
that neonatal circumcision should be discouraged by the medical 
profession.249 In 1991, the Australian College of Pediatrics likewise 
discouraged the practice of neonatal circumcision.250 The National Health 
and Medical Research Council of Australia has stated that neonatal 
circumcision has "no medical indication" and that "the hazards of the 
operation ... outweigh any possible advantages."251 The British Medical 
Association has recommended that male circumcision be performed only 
when medically necessary, stating that complications, including death, 
may result from this generally unnecessary surgery.252 In 1996, the 
Canadian Pediatric Society recommended that "[c)ircumcision of 
newborns should not be routinely performed."253 Significantly, even 
though circumcision is the most frequently performed urological 
procedure on children in the United States, a recent review article in an 
American journal discussing optimal times for performing various 
urological procedures on children did not mention circumcision.254 
The AAP has issued a series of statements regarding circumcision. 
Remarkably, even though the procedure is widespread in the United 
States and performed by many of the organization's members, the AAP 
has never endorsed routine infant circumcision. In 1975, the AAP Task 
Force on Circumcision issued its first policy statement on circumcision, 
248. See generally J. Fred Leditschke, Australian Association of Paediatric 
Surgeons, Guidelines for Circumcision 1 (April1996). 
249. See generally Australian Medical Association, Circumcision Deterred, 6 
AUSTL. MED. 5 (1997). 
250. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, Research Paper: Circumcision 
of Male Infants (Brisbane, Australia: QLRC, 1993), available at 
http://www.cirp.org/library/legal/QLRC (last visited Nov. 12, 2000). 
251. See NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Report of 
the Ninety-Fifth Session 13 (June 1983). 
252. See A Ritual Operation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1458, 1459 (1949); The Case 
Against Neonatal Circumcision, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1163, 1163 (1979). 
253. See Fetus and Newborn Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society, 
Neonatal Circumcision Revisited, 154 CAN. MEn. Ass'N J. 769, 769 (1996). 
254. See generally American Academy of Pediatrics, Section on Urology, 
Timing of Elective Surgery on the Genitalia of Male Children with Particular 
Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and Psychological Effects of Surgery and 
Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590 (1996). 
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concluding that "[t]here is no absolute medical indication for routine 
circumcision of the newborn."255 In 1999, the AAP admitted that scientific 
evidence does not support routine neonatal circumcision.256 Apparently 
unprepared, however, to accept the necessary conclusion that this 
prevalent practice should stop, the AAP merely stressed the importance 
of giving parents of male infants accurate and unbiased information and 
the opportunity to discuss the decision with a doctor.257 In 1991, the 
American Academy of Family Physicians took no position other than to 
state it was a parental decision.258 Numerous medical bodies have stated 
their opposition to neonatal circumcision, or have at least acknowledged 
that the practice is not medically sound.259 Not a single national or 
international medical organization in the world recommends the 
procedure. 
D. Can parental permission for circumcision ever be effective? 
Given the foregoing, one might wonder how parental permission for 
routine circumcision could ever be effective, even if physicians comply 
with the requirements of informed permission. Like all surgical 
procedures, circumcision should not be subject to authorization by a 
surrogate for an incompetent patient unless it is medically necessary. 
While there is some dispute in the American medical community today as 
to whether routine circumcision provides any medical benefit, absolutely 
no one in the medical community seriously maintains that it is medically 
necessary or that it corrects an existing injury, disease or malfunction.260 
255. See Hugh C. Thompson et al., Report of the Ad Hoc Task Force on 
Circumcision, 56 PEDIATRICS 610,611 (1975). 
256. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Task Force on Circumcision, 
Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 686, 691 (1999). 
257. See id. 
258. See American Academy of Family Physicians, Fact Sheet for Physicians 
Regarding Neonatal Circumcision, 52 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 523,525 (1995). 
259. See Am. Academy of Pediatrics Task Force on Circumcision, supra note 
256, at 686; see also Am. Academy of Family Physicians, supra note 256, at 523; 
Thompson, supra note 255, at 610; Fetus and Newborn Committee, supra note 
253, at 769; J. Fred Leditschke, supra note 248; Australian Medical Association, 
supra note 249, at 5; British Medical Association, supra note 252, at 1163. 
260. To make the case that neonatal circumcision is necessary, one would 
need to demonstrate that it is either indispensable, inevitable, mandatory, 
unavoidable, or essential for good health. No one has attempted to make the case 
that all males with foreskins are in poor health. In his pamphlet "Neonatal 
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Accordingly, the Queensland Law Reform Commission in Australia 
recently stated that "consent by parents to [neonatal circumcision] being 
performed may be invalid in the light of the common law's restrictions on 
the ability of parents to consent to the non-therapeutic treatment of 
children. "261 
Both a best interests and a substituted judgment approach support this 
conclusion. Recent cost-utility analyses for neonatal circumcision that 
take as a given the supposed benefits with respect to not only UTis, but 
also cancer and STDs, have concluded that over the course of a lifetime, 
circumcision on the whole either impairs health262 or has virtually no 
medical impact.263 The evidence presented by weighing the costs and 
benefits suggests that circumcision is, in terms of the physical well-being 
of a boy, not in his best interests and not something to which a rational 
and fully informed person would be expected to consent. The inference 
of what the infant male would choose for himself, if able, receives further 
support from the actual choices of intact adult males. If the ultimate goal 
of medical decision-making for an incompetent person is to determine 
what the patient would decide for himself, if able, the best evidence may 
be what similarly situated competent persons actually decide for 
themselves. Of males in the United States that are not circumcised at 
birth, only 3 in 1,000 choose to have the surgery performed later in life, 
Circumcision IS Necessary" surgeon Gerald N. Weiss gives a string of arguments 
lauding the advantages of neonatal circumcision, but never makes the case that 
circumcision is either indispensable or essential for good health. 
261. See Queensland Law Reform Commission, supra note 250; In re Jane, 85 
A.L.R. 409, 435 (Austl. 1988) (discussing the relevance of its finding by 
speculating that a contrary conclusion could lead to a wide range of wrongs 
occurring including female circumcision: "The consequences of a finding that the 
court's consent is unnecessary are far reaching both for parents and for children. 
For example, such a principle might be used to justify parental consent to the 
surgical removal of a girl's clitoris for religious or quasi cultural reasons, or the 
sterilization of a perfectly healthy girl for misguided, albeit sincere, reasons. Other 
possibilities might include parental consent to the donation of healthy organs such 
as a kidney from one sibling to another."). 
262. See Theodore G. Ganiats et a!., Routine Neonatal Circumcision: A Cost-
Utility Analysis, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 282, 282-93 (1991); see also R.S. Van 
Howe, Neonatal Circumcision: a Cost-utility Analysis [Abstract 98086], October 
25-28, 1998 (poster presentation at the 20'h Annual Meeting of the Society for 
Medical Decision-Making, Cambridge, MA.). 
263. See Frank H. Lawler et al., Circumcision: A Decision Analysis of Its 
Medical Value, 23 FAM. MED. 587,590 (1991). 
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suggesting that the overwhelming majority believe that the risks and 
sequelae of becoming circumcised outweigh any supposed benefits.264 If 
doctors followed the AAP Committee's recommendation to delay the 
decision until the child is old enough to grant consent,265 circumcisions 
would rarely be performed in this country, as is the case in most other 
nations. 
One author has noted that parents may authorize overtreatment of a 
child, even though it provides no medical benefits to the child and may 
actually cause harm, because it makes the parents feel better that they are 
purchasing some "care" for their child. The author opines that this is a 
form of child abuse-causing harm to a child in order to gratify parents-
and, perhaps stating the obvious, contends that "the infant's interests 
should absolutely supersede those of his or her parents."266 
E. Non-medical reasons including social concerns and religion 
cannot justify parental permission for circumcision 
Many parents choose circumcision for their sons not because they 
mistakenly believe it is medically beneficial, but rather for non-medical 
reasons. Most common is a concern that their son may have social 
difficulties if his genitals do not look exactly like those of his father and 
those of the majority of his peers.267 This claimed social benefit for the 
child is both unsupported and insufficient to justify a non-consensual 
surgical intervention. It is unsupported because there is no evidence that 
intact boys undergo any greater social difficulties as a result of the 
difference between their genitals and those of their fathers or peers. If 
there were any such risk, any competent parent could easily deal with this 
264. See EDWARD WALLERSTEIN, CiRCUMCISION: AN AMERICAN HEALTH 
fALLACY 131 (1980). 
265. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 131, at 314. 
266. See Dale L. Moore, Challenging Parental Decisions to Overtreat 
Children, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 311, 320 (1995). 
267. See Mark S. Brown & Cheryl A. Brown, Circumcision Decision: 
Prominence of Social Concerns, 80 PEDIATRICS 215, 216, 217 (1987); see generally 
John E. Lovell & James Cox, Maternal Attitudes Toward Circumcision, 9 J. FAM. 
PRAC. 811 (1979). It should be noted that the circumcision rate is already below 
50% in a number of states such as California and a number of American ethnic 
cultures and demographic groups. People of Latino descent, for example, rarely 
circumcise their male children even if born in the United States. See Herzog, supra 
note 146, at 254; see generally Dimitri A. Christakis et al., A Trade-off Analysis of 
Routine Newborn Circumcision, 105 PEDIATRICS 246 (2000). 
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by explaining to their son that his genitals are natural and those of his 
father and some of his peers were surgically altered when they were 
babies. These "social concerns" are not sufficient enough to violate the 
physical integrity of a non-consenting person. 
A small percentage of North American parents choose circumcision for 
religious reasons, and our society is uncomfortable criticizing or 
countermanding parents who act for their children on the basis of deeply 
held convictions. As discussed supra in Part I.D., it is a mistake, however, 
for physicians to believe that parents have a right to make their religious 
beliefs controlling on the question of whether a child is to undergo a non-
medically indicated surgical procedure. No court has ever held that 
parents have a first amendment right to have unnecessary medical 
procedures performed on their children. ro give that power gratuitously 
to certain parents because they have particular religious beliefs would be 
to violate one of their children's constitutional and moral rights-the right 
to equal protection. If the state and the medical profession protect some 
children against medically inappropriate practices, they must protect 
against all medically inappropriate practices unless they can demonstrate 
that denying that protection to some children would be better for those 
children (who themselves have no religious beliefs).268 As the Supreme 
Court has stated, parents are free to make martyrs of themselves but not 
to make martyrs of their children.269 In other words, parents are not free 
to force their children to undergo unnecessary and harmful surgery, 
however well intentioned they might be. A United Kingdom family court 
recently endorsed the principle that at least where two parents of two 
different religions disagreed on whether to circumcise, and where a local 
authority exercising parental responsibility under a care order, a 
circumcision could not be ordered. The court noted that mainstream 
medical opinion in the United Kingdom requires both paternal and 
maternal consent to a circumcision.270 
F. Informed Consent 
Finally, even if non-medically indicated surgery such as circumcision 
268. See supra Part !II.B. 
269. See generally Dwyer, supra note 3, at 1365-1465. 
270. See Re J (Child's Religious Upbringing and Circumcision), [1999] 2 
F.L.R. 678 (Fam. Div.), affirmed, [2000] 1 F.L.R. 571 (C.A.). The Family Division 
decision is also available at http://www.butterworths.co.uk/academic/fortin 
/cases/Re_J.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2000). 
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were legally and ethically permissible to perform on children, parental 
authorization for such surgery would still have to comport with the 
requirements of informed consent. As previously discussed, there are 
three basic requirements to informed consent: 1) disclosure of all relevant 
and material information; 2) verifying and fostering the capacity of the 
decision-maker; and 3) ensuring that the decision is voluntary. 
1. Disclosure 
Physicians are always under a legal and ethical duty to fully disclose to 
the decision-maker all available information regarding a proposed 
procedure. Because the duty requires all available information and not 
just the information a given physician happens to have acquired to be 
disclosed, physicians are under a duty to acquire all available information 
pertinent to a surgery that they perform. Physicians who perform 
circumcisions, therefore, have a legal and ethical duty to their infant 
patients to obtain and provide to the patients' parents all available 
medical information regarding circumcision. This includes all pertinent 
available information about the nature and function of the foreskin, the 
pain that infants incur when it is removed, the risk of complications from 
the surgery, and any possible medical benefits and costs that may result 
from having it removed. A medical practitioner who fails to completely 
disclose the potential physical costs (and, presumably, other 
disadvantages) of a procedure is negligent.271 
a. Nature and purpose of the foreskin 
Recent articles in leading medical journals have documented the 
foreskin's complex structure.272 Although the foreskin has been described 
as "the fold of skin covering the glans,"273 it is actually a complex, 
junctional tissue similar to the eyelids or the lips. It is designed to protect 
the glans of the penis, an internal structure, from trauma and infection.274 
It also contains the highest concentration of fine-touch neuroreceptors in 
the penis. Only lips and fingertips have comparable neuroreceptor 
271. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,167, 170 (1943). 
272. See generally In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988); see also 
Etchells et al., supra note 16, at 178; David Richards, Male Circumcision: Medical 
or Ritual?, 3 J. L. & MED. 371, 374 (1996). 
273. See generally Taylor, supra note 240, at 291; Cold, supra note 246, at 34. 
274. See American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 143, at 388. 
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densities. By contrast, the glans is a neurologically dumb organ.275 Due to 
the foreskin's rich abundance in neuroreceptors and its exquisite 
specialization as a producer of sexual pleasure, it may, in fact, be the most 
sensitive part of the infant male's body.276 
Parents also need to be aware that the anatomically complete penis' 
involuting structure allows for erection without tightening of the skin over 
the penile shaft. During coitus the complete skin system of the penis, 
including the foreskin, allows for non-traumatic intromission and penile 
movement within the vaginal vault without chafing.277 Physicians owe a 
duty to infant male patients to inform their parents of the functionality 
and sensitivity that their sons will lose for a lifetime if a circumcision is 
carried out. 
b. Pain 
Physicians have an obligation to be forthright with parents about the 
pain that infants endure when their foreskin is removed surgically. 
Evidence suggests that physicians rarely do so, and this omission is clearly 
unethical. Many physicians may neglect to discuss the pain with parents 
because they fear it will be disturbing for the parents. But it should be 
disturbing, and physicians owe a duty to the infant patient to make his 
parents aware of this disquieting aspect of circumcision. Physicians have a 
further obligation to make parents aware that adequate and safe 
anesthesia is not available during the neonatal period. They owe no duty 
to parents to make them feel better about granting permission for an 
unnecessary surgery. 
c. Risk of Complications 
Because healthy, richly innervated, erogenous tissue is removed with 
every circumctston, the complication rate of circumcision-if 
"complication" means harmful effect- arguably is 100% because it denies 
the patient the use and function of this specialized tissue. As mentioned 
above, the risk of additional immediate complication is between 2% and 
275. See Fleiss et al., supra note 243, at 364. 
276. See generally Taylor, supra note 240, at 291; Zdenek Halata & Bryce L. 
Munger, The Neuroanatomical Basis for the Protopathic Sensibility of the Human 
Glans Penis, 371 BRAIN RES. 205-30 (1986); M.Von Frey, Beitraege zur 
Physiologie des Schmerzsinns. Zweite Mitt, 46 AKAD WISS LEIPZIG MATH 
NATURWISS KL BER 283-96 (1984). 
277. See Cold, supra note 246, at 41. 
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10%.278 The danger of a later complication, such as meatal stenosis, 
represents an additional 5% to 10% likelihood of a harmful 
complication.279 Many of the potential immediate and later complications 
can be quite severe. Physicians are clearly obligated to make parents 
aware of these complication rates and the nature of the harms that might 
befall their son. 
d. No Significant Medical Benefits 
No significant medical benefit has clearly been demonstrated to result 
from routine neonatal circumcision, and physicians have a duty to inform 
parents of that fact. As discussed below, studies purporting to 
demonstrate prophylactic health benefits have fatal flaws in their design 
and/or focus on maladies that' are extremely rare - much rarer than the 
complications that results from circumcision itself.280 At best, these studies 
demonstrate the truism that amputation of healthy tissue can marginally 
reduce the rate of maladies afflicting the organ from which it was taken, 
simply because less tissue is available to contract a condition. Naturally, 
routine prophylactic amputation in children has never been entertained as 
an ethically or scientifically viable medical procedure. When the 
proposed benefits and real costs are aggregated, as in a cost-utility 
analysis, the proposed benefits are insufficient-to counter the real costs.281 
A physician who states that neonatal circumcision helps these illnesses 
without stating that any potential benefits are far outweighed by the real 
harm perpetrated violates his or her duty to provide accurate, complete 
information. 
e. Are physicians adequately disclosing this information? 
Evidence of actual practice reveals that physicians who perform 
circumcisions themselves know next to nothing about the part of the body 
that they are removing. A 1975 survey revealed that 47% of physicians 
who perform circumcisions believed that a non-retractable foreskin in a 
newborn was an indication for circumcision, when it is perfectly normal 
278. See K. O'Hara & J. O'Hara, The Effect of Male Circumcision on the 
Sexual Enjoyment of the Female Partner, 83 (Suppl. 1) BJU INT'L 79-84 (1999). 
279. SeeN. Williams & L. Kapila, Complications of Circumcision, 80 BRIT. J. 
SURGERY 1231 (1993). 
280. See Patel, supra note 225, at 576; Griffiths, supra note 227, at 184; Persad, 
supra note 227, at 91. 
281. See discussion Part IV.A and IV.B. 
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and healthy for a newborn's foreskin to be non-retractable and for the 
foreskin to become retractable only as a boy approaches adolescence.282 
There is little evidence that physician knowledge has improved ·since 
then.283 
The misinformation promulgated regarding the painfulness of 
circumcision is unconscionable. Parents who cringe when their baby's 
heel is pricked for a blood sample are led to believe that their son feels 
little or no pain when a large part of his penis is cut off. This may be 
because parents typically believe that anesthesia is used even when it is 
not, or that if a local anesthesia is in fact used, the anesthesia is highly 
effective when it is not. 
With respect to the risk of complications and the supposed medical 
benefits associated with circumcision, studies reveal that physicians under-
report the risks and exaggerate the supposed benefits. A 1987 study 
found that physicians routinely inform parents about only a small 
minority of the medical complications and risks associated with elective 
circumcisions.284 The common practice is to mention only pain, infection 
and bleeding as complications of neonatal circumcision.285 This is far 
below the standard level of disclosure for other surgeries, whether 
medically indicated or cosmetic. The physician should disclose each of 
the many potential complications mentioned above, addressing the risks 
of serious bodily harm and even death, the probability of "success," and 
the alternatives to circumcision, and any risks associated with these 
alternatives. A study has shown, however, that physicians do not do 
this.286 When selecting which medical complications to mention to parents, 
physicians tend to use a subjective assessment of the frequency and 
seriousness of complications. The study revealed that the physicians' 
probability estimates were inaccurately low and that their assessments of 
. 282. See Ganiats, supra note 262, at 282; Task Force on Circumcision, supra 
note 256, at 686. 
283. See generally Martin T. Stein et al., Routine Neonatal Circumcision: The 
Gap between Contemporary Policy and Practice, 15 J. FAM. PRAC. 47 (1982). 
284. See generally Christopher R. Fletcher, Circumcision in America in 1998: 
Attitudes, Beliefs, and Charges of Am. Physicians, in MALE AND FEMALE 
CIRCUMCISION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PEDIATRIC 
PRACTICE, 259 (George C. Denniston, Frederick M. Hodges & Marilyn F. Milos 
eds. 1999). 
285. See Jay J. Christensen-Szalanski et al., Circumcision and Informed 
Consent. Is More Information Always Better? 25 MED. CARE 856, 856-67 (1987). 
286. See Fletcher, supra note 284, at 259. 
122 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:61 
the seriousness of potential complications were consistently lower than 
2%1 those expressed by mothers of newborn sons. 
There are many reasons why physicians provide inadequate 
information. Many who discuss the surgery with the mother postpartum 
assume that the arguments for and against circumcision have already been 
discussed with a health care provider. Those who meet with the parents 
well in advance of the birth may simply feel too busy to properly discuss 
the pros and cons with the parents, and may not have equipped 
themselves with the literature necessary to adequately present the facts to 
the parents. Compliance with the medical profession's ethical 
requirement for obtaining true informed consent is a time-consuming, 
laborious process. Doubtless, wherever they can, many physicians will cut 
corners on such a task, especially where, as with circumcision, they may 
believe some parents would prefer not to learn the full truth regarding 
potential complications.288 The current perception that circumcision is 
"just a little snip" and the cultural prejudice that a child's physical 
integrity is less important than an adult's physical integrity makes it easier 
to justify bypassing a full disclosure. 
In addition, physicians may simply feel uncomfortable fully discussing 
with parents the risks of circumcision. Furthermore, many parents choose 
circumcision for non-medical reasons. Likewise, many physicians see 
circumcision as a cultural, not a medical, practice. Physicians may believe 
that discussing the possible complications with parents is more likely to 
upset the parents than to influence the parents' decision. Parental 
hostility following complete disclosure is not uncommon.289 The easiest 
path, in terms of the physician's own comfort, is to provide sparse 
information, because the parents will still sign the "consent form" without 
becoming angry with the provider. Physicians may wish to appease the 
parents because the parents decide who will provide medical care for their 
child, and sometimes the fear of losing patients may override the duty to 
do what is in the best interest of the child. 
Edward Etchells et al. suggest that physicians base the content of their 
discussions with the parents on the perceived motives of each set of 
parents: 
If the parents' decision is based on strong cultural beliefs and 
practices, a detailed, impersonal disclosure of all known risks 
287. See Christensen-Szalansk, supra note 285, at 856. 
288. See id. 
289. See id. at 864. 
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and benefits would probably not be relevant or helpful. 
However, if the decision is based on personal experiences (e.g., 
the father was circumcised), a detailed discussion of the risks 
and benefits would be useful in helping the parents come to a 
decision.290 
123 
This approach is simply untenable. Obvious practical and ethical 
difficulties are created by an approach that requires physicians to 
determine parental motives and to provide widely diverging types and 
levels of information depending on this determination. More 
fundamentally, the authors fail to explain how parental motive alters the 
risks, the benefits, the treatment options, or the physician's duty to the 
patient, i.e., the child, to give full disclosure. Tellingly, physicians' 
positions regarding circumcision are inconsistent with their positions on 
therapeutic privilege291 and substitute consent for adult incompetent 
patients.292 This suggests a failure to accord proper respect to the interests 
and rights of the children who are the patients and an improper focus on 
the interests and desires of parents. The extent of information that 
parents actually want or feel comfortable receiving is legally and ethically 
irrelevant to the physician's duty of disclosure. 
The misleading presentation medical personnel typically give to parents 
may also result from a failure to seek out available information. Three 
years after the release of the 1975 AAP Task Force on Circumcision 
report, which stated that "[t]here is no absolute medical indication for 
routine circumcision of the newborn,"293 only 49% of Chicago area 
pediatricians, obstetricians and family practitioners were aware of the 
AAP's position.294 At that time, 41% recommended routine infant 
circumcision despite the AAP report, while only 15% recommended the 
infants forego the practice.295 The frequency of routine circumcision in 
Chicago area hospitals (70% to 90%) remained unchanged in the three 
years following the AAP's statement.296 Another study in 1975 analyzed a 
randomly selected group of 92 primary care physicians and 103 parents of 
290. See id. 
291. See Edward Etchells et al., Consent for Circumcision, 156 CAN. MED. 
Ass'NJ.17, 18 (1997). 
292. See Etchells, supra note 32, at 389. 
293. See Lazar, supra note 76, at 1437. 
294. See Thompson, supra note 255, at 611. 
295. See Daksha A. Patel et al., Factors Affecting the Practice of Circumcision, 
136 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 634 (1982). 
296. /d. 
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male infants.297 Despite the contents of the 1975 AAP report, 65% of the 
physicians conveyed a positive attitude about routine neonatal 
circumcision to their patients.298 Although pediatricians were more likely 
to have a neutral attitude, both family and general practitioners were 
more likely to favor routine neonatal circumcision.299 
A particular physician's attitude towards circumcision may derive more 
from the result of personal experience and cultural background than from 
careful study of the medical literature. A physician's gender and 
circumcision status, for example, appear to affect whether he or she 
promotes or discourages circumcision. One study found that 100% of the 
health care providers surveyed who encouraged circumcision were male, 
while 81% of those discouraging the surgery were female.300 Another 
survey found that circumcised physicians were more likely to favor 
circumcision than those not circumcised.301 Physicians asked to 
summarize their opinions regarding circumcision offered a wide variety of 
opinions, ranging from "personally I appreciated the cosmetic effect" to 
"barbaric ritual perpetuated for irrational reasons."302 
The Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association instructs 
physicians to "inform [their] patient[s] when [their] personal morality 
would influence the recommendation or practice of any medical 
procedure the patient needs or wants" and to indicate when their opinion 
is contrary to the generally held position of the profession.303 This is 
undoubtedly sound practice. It suggests that a physician who belongs to a 
religion that requires male circumcision should disclose this during any 
discussion with a patient or parent regarding circumcision. Likewise, a 
physician who recommends neonatal circumcision has an obligation to 
state, depending on what country he is practicing in, that his national 
medical organization does not recommend neonatal circumcision. . As 
with any ineffective, outdated treatment, physicians have a sound basis for 
refusing to perforin neonatal circumcision.304 
297. /d. 
298. See Stein, supra note 283, at 47. 
299. See id. 
300. See id. 
301. See Ciesielski-Carlucci et al., supra note 5, at 231. 
302. See Stein et al., supra note 283, at 48, 49 (odds ratio = 9.46, 95% 
confidence interval = 1.70- 52.71). 
303. See Ciesielski-Carlucci, supra note 5, at 234. 
304. See Canadian Medical Association, supra note 38, at 1176A-B. 
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Physicians' failure to adequately inform themselves about circumcision 
and to pass on all acquired relevant information is reflected in the level of 
parental knowledge about circumcision when parents give permission for 
the surgery. A 1979 study surveyed two hundred mothers to determine 
their attitudes toward and knowledge of neonatal circumcision.305 Of 
those that were either doctors or other health care providers, 95% 
circumcised their sons. Although the mothers offered a wide variety of 
reasons for granting permission, few of these reasons. had any medical 
validity (let alone sufficient weight to actually make their decision 
rational). Eighty-seven percent of mothers considered circumcision to be 
without risk of complications, and 80% of mothers stated that no 
physician ever explained the risks to them.306 A 1996 study revealed that 
35% of mothers who gave permission for circumcision of their sons 
believed that neonatal circumcision had no risks involved.307 Twenty-five 
percent of the women in this study believed they had not been given 
h 'f . 308 enoug m ormation. 
Finally, the physician is obligated to disclose all personal interests 
unrelated to the patient's health that he or she may have when obtaining 
consent to medical treatment.309 The Supreme Court of California held 
that a cause of action for lack of informed consent exists where a 
physician fails to disclose, prior to obtaining the patient's consent to 
remove his spleen, that the physician has made arrangements to use 
portions of the spleen for economically beneficial medical research 
310 purposes. 
In the circumcision context, there arises a particularly egregious, if 
relatively rare, application of this principle that has drawn significant 
media attention in recent years - the harvesting of foreskins from living 
babies and the subsequent use of the foreskins for profit by the medical 
industry.311 Clearly such use of foreskins taken from living donors should 
be prohibited even with parental permission, because it is not related in 
any way to the circumcision itself and the affected infant male cannot 
305. See Weijer, supra note 95, at 817. 
306. See Lovell & Cox, supra note 267, at 812. 
307. See id. 
308. See Ciesielski-Carlucci, supra note 5, at 235. 
309. See id. 
310. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
311. See id. at 483. 
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possibly consent to this use of his formerly healthy, functional tissue.312 In 
fact, two American Medical Association (AMA) policy statements appear 
to explicitly bar such a practice. AMA Policy E-2.08 on "Commercial Use 
of Human Tissue," requires informed consent from patients for the use of 
organs or tissues in clinical research, mandates disclosure of potential 
commercial applications prior to realizing a profit on products developed 
from biological materials, prohibits the use of human tissue and its 
products for commercial purposes without the prior informed consent of 
the patient providing the original cellular material, and demands that 
diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives offered to patients conform to 
standards of good medical practice and be free of influence in any way by 
the commercial potential of the patient's tissue.313 AMA Policy E-2.167 
on "The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue Donors" requires that all 
such use have parental approval, that a "clear benefit" to the minor exist, 
that the minor be the only available source of the tissue, and that minors 
be allowed to serve as sources of tissue only for close family members.314 
Medical applications of foreskins harvested from live donors are also 
forbidden under international law pursuant to the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine.315 Even if such use of circumcised 
312. See Karen Wright, Ready-to-wear Flesh, DISCOVER, Nov. 1999, at 46, 46; 
David J. Mooney & Antonios G. Mikos, Growing New Organs, Sci. AM., April 
1999, at 60, 60 (describing work constructing Apligraf skin product using living 
human foreskin cells); Roger A. Pedersen, Embryonic Stem Cells for Medicine, 
SCI. AM., April1999, at 68-69,71 (detailing Advanced Tissue Sciences' creation of 
skin construct Dermagraft from discarded foreskins taken from newborn babies); 
Skin Paved the Way for Tissue Engineering, USA TODAY, Aug. 12,1997, available 
at http://ithaca.rice.edu/kz/USAToday/skinarticle.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2000); 
B. Manson, Forget Pork Bellies, Now It's Foreskins, SAN DIEGO READER, May 4, 
1995 at 255; M.E. Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and 
Limits in Comparative Law, 6 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 29,48 (1983) ("any act 
which tends to demean even a consenting person is radically illicit and a fortiori if 
the act is, in addition, immoral and profit-oriented"). 
313. See AMA Policy, E-2.08 Commercial Use of Human Tissue, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_online (last visited Sept. 4, 2000). 
314. See AMA Policy, E-2.167 The Use of Minors as Organ and Tissue 
Donors, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_online (last visited Sept. 4, 
2000). 
315. See Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 164, Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (April 4, 1997), available at http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/164e.htm 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2000). Article 19 generally prohibits non-therapeutic removal 
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foreskins were ethical, physicians would certainly have an obligation to 
disclose that potential conflict of interests to parents. 
2. Capacity 
Medical personnel have a duty to the newborn child to ensure that 
parental surrogates have the capacity to make a rational, reflective 
decision about circumcision. They should fully disclose all relevant 
information about the procedure well in advance of the birth, and then 
evaluate whether the parents understood the information. If the parents 
do not appear to understand, the physician should attempt to convey the 
information in another way that is clearer to the parents. Some 
researchers have contended that parents are less rational in medical 
decisions concerning their children than they are in medical decisions 
concerning themselves.316 Medical personnel may therefore have a 
heightened duty when dealing with parental surrogates to ensure the 
surrogate is capable of making a rational decision on behalf of the infant 
patient. 
Several studies have looked into different media for presenting 
information to parents about circumcision and what effect each would 
have on the likelihood of parents giving permission. A survey of obstetric 
clinic patients in a large urban hospital showed that oral communication 
of the risks involved would significantly reduce the rate of circumcision 
(72% in the study group versus 94.4% in the control group). The authors 
concluded that mothers in the population they studied requested 
circumcision for their sons because of inadequate medical information or 
strong social motives.317 Another study showed that videotape counseling 
modestly reduced parental peqnission for circumcision when compared 
with standard oral counseling (70.5% versus 75.9%, 0R=0.76, 95%, 
Cl=0.61-0.94). Prior to the study, the circumcision rate at that medical 
of organs or tissue from a living person for transplantation purposes. Article 20 
bars organ or tissue removal from a person without the capacity to consent, with 
certain limited exceptions not applicable here. Article 21 prohibits using the 
human body and its parts to give rise to financial gain. Article 22 provides that 
when in the course of an intervention any human body part is removed, it may be 
stored and used for a purpose other than that for which it was removed only if this 
is done in conformity with appropriate information and consent procedures. 
316. See Alderson, supra note 18, at 106. 
317. See Cynthia S. Rand et al., The Effect of an Educational Intervention on 
the Rate of Neonatal Circumcision, 62 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 64, 64 (1983). 
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center was 90.4%.318 
Parents may actually be resistant to receiving information about 
circumcision, and that would certainly diminish their capacity to 
understand what is presented. One study of oral provision of information 
to mothers about risks had to be suspended when many mothers became 
upset and several expressed their unwillingness to have the physician who 
provided the information care for their children in the future.319 The 
obstetrical nurses were also belligerent to the physician who provided the 
mothers with oral information, because the physician was upsetting their 
patients.320 Parents are often irritated by any discussion of circumcision 
because their minds are already made up.321 Told that circumcision carries 
the risk of penile amputation, serious life-threatening infection, and 
death, parents find their self-esteem challenged by this information, 
because they do not want to unnecessarily place their children at risk 
while at the same time often being unwilling to rethink a decision they 
have already made. In short, they do not want to be confused or unsettled 
by the facts. As noted previously, the physician's obligation is to the 
child, not to the parent, and that obligation includes a duty to overcome 
parental resistance and ensure that parents receive, understand, and take 
into account all of the facts. 322 Otherwise, their permission for 
circumcision of their infant cannot be effective. 
3. Voluntariness 
The voluntariness requirement demands that physicians provide 
information regarding circumcision to parents in an unbiased fashion well 
in advance of the birth and that physicians do not themselves propose the 
procedure to parents. To ensure that any parents who are predisposed to 
request circumcision receive full disclosure in advance of the birth, the 
physician might tell parents that he or she will assume, unless the parents 
indicate otherwise, that the baby is not to be circumcised. If the subject 
first arises at the time of birth, or if parents do not receive the relevant 
information about the procedure until the time of birth, the physician 
should refuse to perform the circumcision until such time as the parents 
318. See Robert W. Enzenauer et al., Decreased Circumcision Rate with 
Videotaped Counseling, 79 S. MED. J. 717,718 (1986). 
319. See Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 285, at 856-67. 
320. /d. 
321. See E.B. Feehan, Letter to the Editor, 60 PEDIATRICS 566 (1977). 
322. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 131, at 314-16. 
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have been able to review the information fully and demonstrate to the 
physician that they understand the information. One group of physicians 
has suggested simply waiting twelve hours after birth before asking 
parents about circumcision, in order to provide an opportunity to discuss 
the procedure's advantages and disadvantages with the parents.323 
However, given the tremendous psychological and physical impact of 
becoming a parent, this waiting period is inadequate to allow the parent 
sufficient opportunity to absorb and analyze information regarding the 
circumcision procedure before making a decision. Some writers have 
questioned whether, given the perinatal emotional upheaval, parental 
permission can ever be truly free and informed in the neonatal context.324 
Indeed, one author (Svoboda) has accumulated a significant number of 
consent forms for neonatal circumcision, not a single one of which 
adequately discloses all significant risks to the procedure in a manner 
parallel to the disclosures which are commonly made for other 
• 325 
surgenes. 
Unfortunately, current practice appears inconsistent with the 
voluntariness requirement as well. It is routine in the United States to ask 
a woman during one of the initial prenatal visits whether she desires 
circumcision for her child if it is a boy.326 As noted above, offering a 
medically unnecessary surgery such as circumcision is unethical.327 It is 
also a subtle form of coercion; offering circumcision to a mother can easily 
be interpreted as a recommendation.328 Mothers are left with the 
impression that "it must be the thing to do, or our doctor would not have 
told us about it. "329 
323. See generally A .G.M. Campbell et a!., Circumcision: A Balanced Report 
Based on Facts, Not Conjecture, 5 PATIENT CARE 56 (1971 ). 
324. See generally S. Mason, Obtaining Informed Consent for Neonatal 
Randomized Controlled Trials-An "Elaborate Ritual"? 76 ARCHIVES DISEASE 
CHILDHOOD F143 (1997). 
325. Sample consent forms on file at the journal's office. 
326. See R.S. Van Howe, Why Does Neonatal Circumcision Persist in the 
United States?, in SEXUAL MUTILATIONS: A HUMAN TRAGEDY 111 (G.C. 
Denniston & M.F. Milos eds. 1997). 
327. See AMA, supra note 37, at 105; Canadian Medical Association, supra 
note 38, at 1176A. 
328. See Van Howe, supra note 326, at 234; A. BRIGGS, CiRCUMCISION: WHAT 
EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNOW, 133-53 (1985). 
329. See generally D. Hovsepian, The Pros & Cons of Routine Circumcision, 
75 CALMED. 360 (1951). 
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Even more troubling is the common occurrence of parents being 
presented with the circumcision question for the first time when a mother 
is in labor at a hospital. Surgeon George Kaplan notes that "all too often 
the consent to circumcise is included in a sheaf of papers that the mother 
signs hurriedly on her way to the delivery room. No discussion has been 
held regarding the merits of the procedure or of the inherent risks. "330 
Kaplan characterizes this practice as "inexcusable."331 Raising the 
circumcision issue for the first time upon the mother's arrival at the 
hospital to give birth amounts to manipulation and coercion. Because the 
physician and the hospital benefit financially from the parent's decision, 
such a practice raises grave concerns about unethical profiteering. 
Effective consent to elective, cosmetic surgery cannot arise unless and 
until the patient himself is capable of giving it. Infant males are clearly 
incapable of giving voluntary consent (and in fact uniformly howl in 
protest of the procedure), and without medical necessity and urgency, 
there is no justification for looking to a surrogate to give permission. 
Unlike cases involving medical necessity for treatment of a child, in the 
circumcision context there is simply no predicate for departing from the 
general rule that the patient himself must give voluntary consent to any 
incursion on his physical integrity by medical professionals. The AAP 
Committee on Bioethics sensibly recommends delaying elective, cosmetic 
surgery until a child is old enough to give consent, and this would apply to 
circumcision.332 As previously mentioned, the Australian Association of 
Pediatric Surgeons has taken this position specifically with respect to 
circumcision,333 as have scholars who have considered the issue.334 
Because, as discussed above, no sufficient reasons exist for not deferring 
the procedure, ethically and legally it must be deferred, given the harm 
caused by the procedure and the probability that as an adult the patient 
will most likely not desire it. 
With all the compelling reasons to delay circumcision, it is necessary to 
examine why circumcision is performed at such a young age. For many 
years, two rationales supported the practice of circumcising right after 
330. See generally G.W. Kaplan, Circumcision - An Overview, 7 CURRENT 
PROBLEMS PEDIATRICS 1 (1977). 
331. See id. 
332. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 131, at 315-17. 
333. See Leditschke, supra note 248, at 1. 
334. See Alderson, supra note 18, at 32. 
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birth. First, it was once thought that the newborn could not feel pain.335 
Although this has been proven false,336 and the opposite - that newborns 
actually feel greater pain from the same trauma than do adults - has been 
proven true, some physicians still blindly adhere to the old myth.337 
Second, it was regarded as less costly to perform circumcision right after 
birth because general anesthesia is not used.338 That rationale might have 
some force if the first rationale, that babies feel less or no pain, were true, 
but it is hard to imagine any medical professional seriously espousing this 
rationale today, when the babies-feel-no-pain myth has been destroyed. 
One would expect that medical professionals would not use ineffective 
anesthesia on older children and adults simply because it would be 
cheaper, and that no parents would knowingly agree to subject their 
infant to excruciating pain when that could easily be avoided, simply to 
save money. 
But old habits die hard in the medical profession. In the case of 
children, rationality runs up against an additional obstacle - a pervasive, 
unconscious view of children as less than full persons and of childhood as 
simply a time to be gotten through, a prelude to adulthood rather than a 
period of life having independent worth, which should be as happy a time 
as society can make it. Medical personnel possessing this attitude may 
decide that pain in infancy is less cause for concern than pain in later life; 
adult pain is serious, but infant pain will be gotten over. So it may well be 
a lack of respect for newborns as persons and a lack of concern for their 
experience rather than any genuine medical rationale that compel 
physicians to perform circumcision in the neonatal period.339 
335. M. Fitzgerald & N. Mcintosh, Pain and Analgesia in the Newborn , 64 
ARCHIVES OF DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD 441 (1989); see generally Nancy 
Wellington & Michael J. Rieder, Attitudes and Practices Regarding Analgesia for 
Newborn Circumcision, 92 PEDIATRICS 541 (1993) (finding that 12% of physicians 
did not believe that newborns could feel pain and 35% believed that neonates 
could not remember pain); William L. Toffler et. , Dorsal Penile Nerve Block 
during Newborn Circumcision: Underutilization of a Proven Technique? 3 J. OF 
THE AMERICAN BOARD OF FAMILY PRACTICE 171 (1990) (concluding that 29% of 
physicians did not believe the pain response to circumcision was significant). 
336. See Anand & Hickey, supra note 230, at 1326. 
337. See generally G .N. Weiss & E.B. Weiss, A Perspective on Controversies 
over Neonatal Circumcision, 33 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 726 (1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
Infants do not have the capacity to give consent to any aspect of their 
medical care. Physicians may. only obtain legally valid permission from 
parents to perform procedures on their incompetent children, provided 
full disclosure of all material information is made to parents who are able 
to understand the. information and to appreciate the consequences of their 
decision, and provided that the parents are able to decide whether to 
grant their permission free from any manipulation or undue influence. 
Moreover, regardless of the motivations and desires of physicians and 
parents, the only interventions for which parents may grant their 
permission are those conferring benefits that clearly outweigh the short-
and long-term costs for the infant patient. 
Consent places physicians in a very delicate position, one that is 
appropriately governed by stringent ethical norms. Physicians should 
approach decision-making on behalf of a newborn with the greatest 
caution and with a strong presumption against intrusive procedures. 
Amputating a highly sensitive and functional part of the body is extremely 
intrusive and should be undertaken only in situations of urgent necessity. 
Neonatal circumcision as it is routinely performed in this country clearly 
does not satisfy this criterion. It is therefore unethical and unlawful, and 
no parental permission for the procedure should be effective. Moreover, 
even if it were permissible for physicians to give effect to parental 
permission for circumcision, physicians would be under a stringent 
obligation to their infant patients to ensure that any such permission is 
informed-voluntarily given based upon competent review of all relevant 
information. Available evidence suggests that physicians today routinely 
fail to fulfill this duty. In doing so, they discredit their profession and 
expose themselves to legal liability. 
Consent to neonatal circumcision has not been directly considered by 
the courts; therefore, our analysis, out of necessity, relies on established 
legal precedents of cases that share common elements with neonatal 
circumcision. With near uniformity, these precedents indicate that any 
consent given for neonatal circumcision would not be valid. Court 
decisions are in part influenced by the culture in which they occur.340 
However, circumcision has gradually but steadily been falling out of favor 
in the past few decades. When the balance of public opinion shifts to 
opposing the practice, the legal system will likely become more accepting 
of lawsuits and lobbying for the protection of baby boys. Consequently, 
340. See Svoboda, supra note 3, at 206-08. 
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the legal system will no longer be able to ignore the conflict between this 
practice and the legal and ethical duties of medical professionals. In the 
meantime, the medical community ought to hold its members responsible, 
and every medical professional should personally reexamine the ethics of 
the practice. 
The persistence of routine neonatal circumcision in this country may be 
explained partly as cultural blindness, a blindness that afflicts medical 
professionals as much as it does the general population. Part of the 
explanation also lies in a disregard for the distinct personhood and the 
dignity of children. The analogy to sterilization of mentally retarded 
women is most telling; though once done routinely, primarily to avoid the 
social costs of creating wards of the state and of creating more disabled 
individuals, sterilization now requires court approval and a strong 
showing that it would be medically beneficial to the incompetent woman. 
Even in fairly compelling circumstances, courts have denied permission 
for sterilization of an incompetent patient. The change came about when 
we as a society began to respect the mentally disabled as persons and to 
accord them the dignity they are due as persons. We must now do the 
same for children, and that will mean ending the practice of routine infant 
male circumcision. 
